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THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS' USE OF
STATE COURT DECISIONS IN TAX CASES:
"PROPER REGARD" MEANS "NO REGARD"
PAUL L. CARON*
I. The Past: The Role of State Court Decisions in the Pre-Bosch World
Numerous federal tax provisions incorporate state law. However, the federal
courts and the Internal Revenue Service (the Service)' have long struggled over
how much weight must be given in a federal tax controversy to a lower state court's
interpretation of state law in prior litigation involving the taxpayer. As I have
explained in a recent article,2 the struggle reflects competing revenue and comity
concerns.' On one hand, the revenue interest would permit federal authorities to
independently review the state law question in the subsequent federal tax
controversy, thereby giving "no regard" to the lower state court's interpretation of
state law. On the other hand, the comity interest would require federal authorities
to defer to the lower state court's application of state law, thereby giving "total
regard" to the lower state court's decision.! The Supreme Court has balanced these
policies differently over time in its various formulations of the requisite degree of
deference to state court decisions in subsequent federal tax litigation.
Over seventy-five years ago, the Court initially gave primacy to the comity
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. A.B., 1979, Georgetown
University; J.D., 1983, Cornell Law School; LL.M. (Taxation), 1988, Boston University. I am grateful
for the research assistance provided by David Clodfelter, Gina Estenfelder, and George Rathman, students
at the University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. The Service and the federal courts are referred to collectively in this article as "federal authori-
ties."
2. Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and
Beyond, 71 OR. L. REV. 781 (1992) [hereinafter Caron, State Court Decisions]; see also Paul L. Caron,
Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517,
588-90 (1994) [hereinafter Caron, Tax Myopia].
3. I use the term "revenue concern" to refer to the Service's interest in ensuring the correct
application of state law to protect federal coffers. I use the term "comity concern" to refer to the respect
that the federal courts and the Service should give to a state court's application of state law in our federal
system. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (describing comity as "a proper respect for
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuation of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions am left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways"); Michael
Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. REv. 59, 61 n.5 (1981) ("Comity
is a sufficiently imprecise word to permit its use in a variety of contexts that have in common little more
than the perceived need for such an abstraction to aid in the resolution or avoidance of conflict between
governmental bodies.").
4. See Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 785-87.
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concern in Uterhart v. United States' by requiring that federal authorities defer to
a lower state courfs application of state law.' In the 1930s, before its landmark
Erie decision,7 the Court tried to accommodate the revenue concern in Freuler v.
Helvering' and Blair v. Commissione? by requiring that federal authorities only
defer to "noncollusive" lower state court decisions." Over the next thirty years, the
lower federal courts balanced the competing policies differently by formulating
varying definitions of "collusion." Some courts emphasized the comity concern by
requiring that federal authorities defer to all "nonfraudulent" lower state court deci-
sions." The majority of courts tried to balance the competing policies by requiring
that federal authorities defer only to "adversary" lower state court decisions. 2
However, these courts ignored the impact of Erie, decided the year after Blair.
In 1967, the Court tried to reinject a balance between the revenue and comity
interests through the Erie framework. In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch," the
Court rejected the "nonfraudulent" and "adversary" tests and instead held that
federal authorities must give "proper regard" to lower state court decisions.
However, the Court did not further define the deference that federal authorities must
afford lower state court decisions under this standard, other than noting that they "in
effect, [must] sit ... as a state court."'5 This article is the first attempt to
5. 240 U.S. 598 (1916).
6. See Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 787-90.
7. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
9. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
10. See Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 790-97.
11. Id. at 799-801.
12. Id. at 802-08.
13. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
14. See Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 808-23.
15. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465. For further discussion of Bosch, see Kingsbury Browne, Jr.
& Joseph D. Hinkle, Tar Effects of Non-Tax Litigation: Bosch and Beyond, 27 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAx'N 1415 (1969); Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., Bosch and Other Dilemmas: Binding the Parties and the Tax
Consequences in Trust Dispute Resolution, 18 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 9-1 (1984); George
Craven, Tax Effect of Sfate Court Decisions - The Bosch Case, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 457
(1967); Martin L. Fried, External Pressures on Internal Revenue: The Effect of State Court Adjudications
in Tax Litigation, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647 (1967); Leon C. Misterek, A Role for State Court Adjudications
in Federal Tax Cases - A Proposal, 3 VAL. U. L. R-v. 1 (1968); William H. Scharf, State Law in the
Tax Court - Controlling Precedents, 26 TAx LAW. 293 (1972); Jonathan Sobeloff, Tax Effect of State
Court Decisions - The Impact of Bosch, 21 TAX LAW. 507 (1968); Charles W. Ufford, Jr., Bosch and
Beyond, 60 A.B.A. J. 334 (1974); Gilbert P. Verbit, State Court Decisions in Federal Transfer Tax
Litigation: Bosch Revisited, 23 REAL PROP., PROB & TR. J. 407 (1988); Kenneth M. Wissbrun, Bosch
and Its Aftermath: The Effect of State Court Decisions on Federal Tax Questions, 114 TR. & EST. 8
(1975); Bernard Wolfroan, Bosch, Its Implications and Aftermath: The Effect of State Court
Adjudications on Federal Tax Litigation, 3 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 2-1 (1969); Patrick D. Deem,
Comment, The Relevancy of State Court Adjudications of Property Rights, 70 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1968);
John J. Kendrick, Jr., Note, Binding Effect of State Court Judgment in Federal Tax Cases, 21 Sw. L.J.
540 (1967); Richard L. K(intz, Note, The Binding Effect of a Lower State Court Decision in Subsequent
Federal Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 890 (1968); Randall D. Mock, Note, The Role of State Trial Court
Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 227 (1968); Arthur R. Philpott, Note, Federal
Taxation - Effect of State Court Determination of Property Rights on Federal Court, 42 TUL. L. REv.
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systematically examine, on a circuit-by-circuit basis, how the federal courts of
appeals have applied the Bosch "proper regard" test over the past twenty-five years.
Part HI of the article reports the results of this empirical research illustrating how
the Bosch "proper regard" standard has proven to be unworkable in practice. In
particular, the courts of appeals have misunderstood the Erie underpinnings of the
standard and have focused exclusively on the revenue concern in subjecting the state
law question to a de novo standard of review and concluding in over one-half of the
relevant cases that the lower state court had misapplied state law. The courts of
appeals thus have undermined Bosch by giving "no regard" to the lower state court's
application of state law, despite the Bosch Court's intent to use the "proper regard"
test to balance the competing policies.
Part ll of the article explores the lessons to be drawn from the past quarter
century of misuse of the Bosch standard. By focusing on the nuances within and
among the circuits, the article hopefully will assist lawyers, judges, and commenta-
tors both in assessing the continued viability of the Bosch framework and in
applying the "proper regard" standard in cases in the various circuits.
II. The Present: A Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis
of the Bosch "Proper Regard" Standard
This part examines the 233 federal appellate court cases that have cited Bosch in
the twenty-five-year period from June 5, 1967, the date of the Bosch decision,
through December 31, 1992.16 As the following chart indicates, the courts of
appeals have concluded in over one-half (61%) of the cases that the lower state
courts had misapplied state law: 7
676 (1968); Note, Bosch and the Binding Effect of State Court Adjudications upon Subsequent Federal
Tax Litigation, 21 VAND. L. REV. 825 (1968); Comment, Federal Courts Not Bound by State Trial
Court's Determination of Taxpayer's Property Interest, 52 MINN. L. REv. 776 (1968); Comment, State
Court Determinations in Tax Litigation: A New Era, 41 S. CAL L. REV. 197 (1967); Note, State Trial
Court Judgments on Property Rights Not Conclusive on Federal Courts Adjudicating Federal Tax
Consequences, 21 VAND. L. REV. 161 (1967); Jeffrey M. Kilmer, Recent Case, Decisions of Lowest State
Court Are Not Binding on Federal Courts in Federal Tax Litigation, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 728 (1967);
Stephen K. Lambright, Recent Development, Effect of a State Court's Characterization of Property
Rights on a Subsequent Federal Tax Proceeding, 12 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 160 (1968); Michael R. McGee,
Recent Case, Effect of a State Court Adjudication of Property Rights in Subsequent Federal Tax
Litigation, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 549 (1968); Recent Decision, State Trial Court Determinations Not Binding
in Federal Tax Proceedings, 34 BROOK. L. REv. 156 (1967); Recent Development, Supreme Court
Announces "Proper Regard" Test to Determine Conclusiveness of State Court Adjudications of Property
Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1055.
16. The cases were culled from Shepard's United States Citations and the Prentice Hall Federal
Taxes Citator, as supplemented by LEXIS and Westlaw searches. In addition, other research strategies
located several federal appellate court cases that considered the effect of a lower state court decision in
a subsequent federal tax controversy without citing Bosch. Although a few relevant federal appellate
court cases may have escaped this research net, there likely are not a sufficient number of such cases to
detract from the article's findings and conclusions. Of course, the results of this empirical research must
be interpreted in light of both the inherent limitations of such a focus on reported cases and the "selection
effect." See Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 823 n.195, 832 n.233.
17. This figure includes cases that take a position on any aspect of state law contrary to that of the
1993]
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TABLE 1 -BOSCH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Tax Cases Tax Cases
Cases Tax Cases Following Not Following
Citing Citing State Court State Court
Circuit Bosch Bosch On State Law On State Law
D.C. 6 0 0 0
First 9 3 1 I
Second 25 11 0 4
Third 45 3 1 1
Fourth 20 9 0 1
Fifth 25 13 1 6
Sixth 16 4 2 1
Seventh 22 4 1 2
Eighth 6 4 2 0
Ninth 30 7 1 0
Tenth 15 8 2 3
Eleventh 2 0 0 0
Federal 12 8 1 0
Total 233: 74 12 19
39%71 61%
lower state court, even though the federal court may agree with other aspects of the state court's
application of state law. Of course, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from this data showing
that over one-half of the cases in the courts of appeals have taken a view of state law contrary to that
of the state court. Given the relatively small number of relevant cases and the lack of a comparative
yardstick of results in other areas in which a federal court must rule on the correctness of a state court's
application of state law hi a case involving a party to the federal proceeding, the precise percentage of
cases reaching this result probably is less important than the courts of appeals' adoption of de novo
review in the face of the "proper regard" standard.
18. Of these 233 cases, the text of this article discusses the 33 cases that directly bear on the
application of the Bosch "proper regard" standard in federal tax litigation. Most of these cases involve
prior state court litigation by the taxpayer embroiled in the federal tax controversy. The footnotes of this
article discuss many of the other cases that lack similar state court litigation involving the taxpayer but
possess other features that may be helpful in determining a particular circuit's implementation of the
"proper regard" standard. The remaining cases are not discussed because they generally cite Bosch for
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This part discusses the 233 cases in a circuit-by-circuit format to determine how the
federal courts of appeals have applied the Bosch "proper regard" standard over the
past twenty-five years.
A. District of Columbia Circuit
None of the six District of Columbia cases that cite Bosch are tax cases. 9
B. First Circuit
Of the nine First Circuit cases citing Bosch, three are tax cases. In the two cases
that directly applied Bosch in tax disputes,' the First Circuit construed the "proper
regard" standard as requiring de novo review of the probate court's application of
state law." In the first case, the First Circuit ruled that the probate court had
incorrectly applied state law, stating that it was not bound by "the gloss of a probate
court decree," particularly where it was not the product of an adversary proceed-
ing.' In the second case, the First Circuit construed the probate court's decree to
conform to its view of state law without commenting on the adversarial nature of
the state court proceedingY
In Abeley v. Commissioner (In re Estate of Abeley),u the probate court awarded
widow's allowance. The Service denied the estate's claimed marital deduction on the
ground that the widow's allowance was contingent within the meaning of section
2056(b).' The Tax Court agreed that widow's allowance was a nopdeductible
terminable interest but did not rule on the validity of the probate court's interpreta-
tion of state law.' The First Circuit affirmed on two grounds. First, the court
agreed that widow's allowance was contingent as a matter of federal tax law'
Second, the court conducted a de novo review and concluded that the probate court
had misapplied state law.' The First Circuit indicated that under Bosch, the
probate decree was to be afforded no deference:
Whatever the motives of the heirs in perhaps assenting to, and in any
event not appealing from a probate decree conspicuously outside of the
19. In Bryant v. Civiletti, 663 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a habeas case in which there was a prior
D.C. District Court adjudication of the defendant's guilt, the D.C. Circuit stated that, under Bosch, "while
federal courts give 'proper regard' to decisions of lower state trial courts they are not required to follow
them." IL at 292 n.15.
20. In the other case, there was no prior state court proceeding. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 634 F.2d 5 (Ist Cir. 1980).
21. This article uses the terms "lower state court" and "probate court" interehangeably, regardless
of differences in jurisdiction, title, and characteristics of such courts in individual states.
22. Abeley v. Commissioner (In re Estate of Abeley), 489 F.2d 1327, 1328 (1st Cir. 1974), affg
Abeley v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 120 (1973).
23. Estate of Draper v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 944, 947 (lst Cir. 1976), rev'g 64 T.C. 23 (1975).
24. 489 F.2d 1327 (1st Cir. 1974), affg Abeley v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 120 (1973).
25. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1988). In the remainder of this article, sections of the Internal Revenue Code
will be referred to in the text without citation, unless they are directly quoted.
26. Abeley v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 120, 123-24 (1973).
27. Estate of Abeley, 489 F.2d at 1328 (citing Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964)).
28. Id.
1993]
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scope of the s;tatutory provision, the taxing powers of the government
are not to be avoided by private arrangements even though they receive
the gloss of a probate court decree."
Estate of Draper v. Commissioner" involved a murder-suicide in which husband
killed wife and then himself. Although husband was the owner and named
beneficiary of two insurance policies on wife's life, the probate court concluded that
state public policy prevented husband's estate from recovering the insurance
proceeds." The probate court ruled that wife's estate also could not recover the
proceeds because she had "no interest" in the policies; she was the insured and not
the owner of the policies. Instead, the court directed the proceeds to be paid to the
couple's three child::en. Although the Service claimed that the insurance proceeds
were taxable in both husband's and wife's estates, the "essence" of the Service's
position apparently was that "the insurance proceeds must be taxed in one estate or
the other, if not in [husband's] estate then in [wife's]. 32
The Tax Court held that the proceeds were taxable in husband's estate but not in
wife's estate. As to husband's estate, the Tax Court concluded that the state public
policy against a murderer receiving the proceeds from insurance on his victim's life
was not implicated because neither husband nor his estate benefitted from the
murder. Despite the probate court's reliance on this state public policy, the Tax
Court focused on the payment of the proceeds to the couple's children pursuant to
the exercise of the probate court's equitable jurisdiction.3
As to wife's estate, the Tax Court gave "proper regard" to the probate court's
ruling that wife had "no interest" in the proceeds.' The Tax Court stated that it
had "no doubt that the [highest court in the state] would have approved the order
of the Probate Court if presented with the question. 0
5
The First Circuit reversed and held that the proceeds were taxable in wife's estate
but not in husband's estate. As to husband's estate, the First Circuit agreed with the
probate court that husband and his estate were estopped under state law from
receiving the proceeds. As a result, the First Circuit concluded that there was
nothing of value to include in husband's estate.'
As to wife's estate, the First Circuit construed the probate court's conclusion that
wife had "no interest" in the proceeds to mean merely that wife had no legal interest
under state law.37 Accordingly, the probate court did not mean to suggest that wife
lacked an equitable interest under state law to direct the distribution of the proceeds.
As a result, the Fir;t Circuit concluded that the proceeds were taxable in wife's
29. Id.
30. 536 F.2d 944 (1 a Cir. 1976), rev'g 64 T.C. 23 (1975).
31. Estate of Draper v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 23, 30 (1975).
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 32-33.
34. Id. at 29-30.
35. Id. at 31-32.




FEDERAL COURT USE OF STATE TAX DECISIONS
estate because they were paid to the children in accordance with her testamentary
intent."
The First Circuit stated that it would be contrary to state law to interpret the
probate court's decree as denying wife an equitable interest in the proceeds.39 The
First Circuit cited Bosch for the proposition that "[a]lthough we would give [the
probate court decree] 'proper regard,' it would not be binding where we believed the
highest court in the [state] would rule differently."'
C. Second Circuit
Eleven of the twenty-five cases that cite Bosch" in the Second Circuit are tax
cases.4 Although eight of these cases involved a prior state court proceeding,43
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 949-50 n.8.
41. Here and elsewhere in this article, the reference to cases that have cited Bosch includes cases
that considered the effect of a lower state court decision in subsequent federal tax litigation without
actually citing Bosch. See supra note 16.
42. Cheng Yih-Chun v. Federal Reserve Bank, 442 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1971), a nontax case, involved
application of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. A probate court ordered the Treasury to transfer
funds held by a foreigner in a United States bank at his death to his son (also a foreigner). The district
court held that the state court ruling did not bind the Treasury because it was not a party to the state
proceeding. On appeal, the son "loudly invoking the principles of an orderly federal-state relationship,"
argued that "the federal court should have respected the [probate court's] decision." Id. at 463. Although
the Service "piously" defended the district court's decision not to follow the probate court's ruling without
citing Bosch, the Second Circuit affirmed; based on that case, the district court was not controlled by the
state court ruling, "but was bound to consider, after giving 'proper regard' to the [probate court's]
decision, whether the law of the [state] was otherwise." Id. at 464. After a de novo review of state law,
the Second Circuit concluded that the district court correctly decided that the probate court had
misapplied state law. Id.
43. The other tax cases are Rolin v. Commissioner, 588 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1978), affjg 68 T.C. 919
(1977); Estate of Trunk v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1977), remanding 65 T.C. 230 (1975);
Estate of Tilyou v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g 56 T.C. 1362 (1971).
In Estate of Trunk, wife had an income interest in three trusts established by her husband's will. Three
years after husband's death, pursuant to wife's request, the trustee paid her a sum of cash from one of
the trusts as an "elective bequest" under the will. Wife, as executrix, included the elective bequest as part
of the marital deduction under the will. The Commissioner denied the marital deduction on the ground
that the bequest was either conditional or terminable. Wife argued that the bequest qualified for the
marital deduction either as an unencumbered elective bequest or as a discretionary power of appointment
over a portion of wife's life estate.
Although the Tax Court denied the marital deduction, it rejected both of the Service's arguments.
Instead, the Tax Court concluded that husband never intended to make an additional bequest to wife.
Estate of Trunk v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 230, 239 (1975). The Tax Court noted that although its
interpretation of husband's intent apparently conflicted with the remainderman's consent to the accounting
providing for the payment of the bequest to wife, under Bosch, "the burden rests on this Court to
interpret the will, irrespective of any proceedings in the State courts." Id. at 240 n.3.
The Second Circuit in Estate of Trunk remanded to force the Tax Court to allow wife to present
evidence on her husband's intent. The Second Circuit noted that "[a]lthough the proceedings in the
[probate c]ourt are not binding upon the United States when not a party [under Bosch], it is of interest
to note that the construction urged upon the Tax Court by appellant has already been agreed to by all
of the parties in the [probate court's] accounting." Estate of Trunk, 550 F.2d at 85.
1993]
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only five directly considered the "proper regard" standard. Of the other three tax
cases, two did no' involve the application of state law." The remaining case
On remand, the Tax Court allowed wife to present other evidence and concluded, based on this
uncontradicted evidence, that husband intended to give wife an unconditional right to receive the bequest.
As a result, the bequest qualified for the marital deduction. Estate of Trunk v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 497, 498 (1978).
44. In these two cases, the federal tax issue concerned I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2), which allows
administration expenses to be deducted for estate tax purposes if they "are allowable by the laws of the
jurisdiction ... under which the estate is being administered." I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1988). In United
States v. White, 853 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'g 650 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. dismissed,
493 U.S. 5 (1989), the district court held that the Service could not "second guess" a probate court's
allowance of fees paid to the estate's attorney where the probate court had "passed upon the critical facts
upon which deductibility depend[ed]," absent a showing by the Service that the probate court's decision
was motivated by factors such as "fraud, overreaching or excessiveness by the attorney or the [probate
court]." United States v, White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1987). The district court stated that
to allow the Service to second-guess the probate court here would destroy federal-state comity. Id. at
909.
The district court distinguished Bosch on two grounds. First, unlike Bosch, the legislative history of
the administration expense deduction at issue in White did not refer to the "proper regard" standard;
instead, the Code and rrgulations indicated that the Service "ordinarily" should accept a lower state
court's allowance of administration expenses if the court "pass[ed] upon the facts upon which
deductibility depend[ed]." Id. at 911. Second, unlike Bosch, the highest court of the state here had
clearly set forth the legal standards to be applied in allowing attorneys' fees, and the probate court had
applied those standards n approving the fees. Id.
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that, as in Bosch, there was no evidence that "Congress
unambiguously intended to make state trial court decrees determinative of the federal deductibility of
[administration] expenses to the exclusion of any federal inquiry." United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107,
113 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit concluded that under Bosch the Service was entitled to make
an independent examinaiion as to the validity of the attorney fees under state law as determined by the
state's highest court: although the Service was "bound by the factors established by [the highest state
court] .... it [was] not bound by the [probate court's] application of these factors." Id. at 114. Rather,
according to Bosch, the [probate court's] ruling only need be given 'proper regard' as one court's
interpretation of applicable state law." Id. As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that the Service
could reexamine the allowability of the attorneys' fees under state law. Id.
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975), affg 57 T.C. 650 (1972), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975), the executors incurred commission expenses in the gradual liquidation of
the 425 pieces of sculpture included in decedents estate. The probate court approved the estate's payment
of commissions incurred in the sales. The Tax Court held that the state court's allowance of the
commissions as deductille administration expenses was not the conclusive test for deductibility under
§ 2053(a)(2). The Tax Court concluded that the commissions were deductible only to the extent they
were "necessary" under the regulations to pay the decedent's debts, administration expenses, and taxes
as finally determined. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 654-55 (1972).
The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting the executors' argument that the probate court's allowance of
the commission expenses controlled their allowance as administrative expenses under the Internal
Revenue Code. Estate cf Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83. The Second Circuit noted that the commission
expenses were not contested in the probate court and there was some question whether the expenses were
incurred for the individual beneficiaries rather than for the estate's benefit. In these circumstances, the
Second Circuit indicated that under Bosch, "federal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining a lower
state court's allowance of administration expenses to determine whether they were in fact necessary to
carry out the administration of the estate or merely prudent or advisable in preserving the interests of the
beneficiaries." Id. The Second Circuit stated that the Tax Court's determination was not a refusal to
follow state law, but rather the result of a de novo inquiry into the factual necessity for the expenditures.
[Vol. 46:443
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involved the effect of a decision by the highest court of the state in a subsequent
federal tax controversy.4
In all five of the cases that applied the "proper regard" standard, the Second
Circuit indicated that Bosch required independent review of the state court's
application of state law. In two of these cases, the Second Circuit focused on the
nonadversariness of the state court proceeding. However, in the other three cases,
the Second Circuit did not comment on the adversariness of the state court
proceeding. Under both approaches, the Second Circuit concluded that the state
court had misapplied state law.
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, the Second Circuit was required on
remand from the Supreme Court to implement the "proper regard" standard. In that
case, husband established a revocable inter vivos trust giving wife a life income
interest and a testamentary general power of appointment over the remainder.
Id. at 483.
Judge Mulligan dissented "with respect but without reluctance." Id. (Mulligan, J., dissenting). Judge
Mulligan argued that state law was the sole test for deductibility under § 2053(a)(2) and that "neither the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue nor the Tax Court, in my view, can properly reverse the State Court
determination." Id. He stated that "[t]he laws of the state are interpreted and administered by the courts
of the state and not by the Tax Court." Id. at 484. He distinguished Bosch on the ground that unlike §
2053(a)(2), in the marital deduction at issue in that case Congress had not ceded exclusive jurisdiction
on the federal tax question to state law and the state courts. Id. at 484 n.l. For further discussion of the
proper roles for federal and state law under § 2053(a)(2), see Paul L. Caron, Must an Administration
Expense Allowed by State Law Also Meet a Federal Necessity Test?, 70 J. TAX'N 352 (1989) [hereinafter
Caron, Administration Expense]; Paul L. Caron, New Decision Further Clouds Deductibility of Expenses
Incurred During Administration, 11 EsT. PLAN. 164 (1984); Paul L. Caron, Note, The Estate Tax
Deduction for Administration Expenses: Reformulating Complementary Roles for Federal and State Law
Under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2), 67 CORNELL L. REv. 981 (1982) [hereinafter Caron, Reformulating
Complementary Roles].
45. In Rose v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1988), affig 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346 (1987), a
taxpayer sold property to a buyer in exchange for a seven-year nonrecourse purchase money note and
mortgage. Eighteen months later, the taxpayer assigned the note and mortgage to a lender as collateral
for a loan. The buyer agreed to make payments due on the note to lender, and the taxpayer guaranteed
the buyer's obligations and agreed to repurchase the note. After the buyer defaulted, the lender agreed
to foreclose against the property and the taxpayer agreed to repurchase the property from the lender and
to pay other damages. The lender foreclosed and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for a
nominal sum, but the taxpayer refused to repurchase the property. The lender sued the taxpayer in state
court, and the highest court in the state agreed with the lender's position in assessing monetary damages
against the taxpayer and requiring him to take possession of the property. See GIT Indus. v. Rose, 464
N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1984), affg mem. 462 N.Y.S.2d 245 (A.D. 1983).
The taxpayer claimed a bad debt deduction as a result of the mortgage foreclosure, which the Service
disallowed on the ground that the taxpayer had not proven the worthlessness of the debt in that year. The
Tax Court denied the bad debt deduction because, as the highest court in the state had found, the
taxpayer had received the proceeds of the foreclosure and reacquired the property. Rose v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346, 1346-47 (1987).
On appeal, the taxpayer argued that he did not regain title to the property in satisfaction of the debt
because lender repurchased the property at the foreclosure sale and thus extinguished his rights to the
property. However, the Second Circuit held that the contrary decision of the highest court in the state
was binding on the Second Circuit under Bosch. Rose, 855 F.2d at 67.
46. 382 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam), on remand from 387 U.S. 456 (1967), rev'g &
remanding 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966), affg 43 T.C. 120 (1964).
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Although the revocable nature of the trust would cause it to be included in
husband's estate under section 2038, his estate would qualify for the marital
deduction. However, wife apparently was concerned with the tax consequences to
her estate, and she partially released the power, thereby converting it into a special
power. Upon husbamd's death, the Service denied a marital deduction on the ground
that wife no longer possessed a general power as a result of her earlier partial
release.47
While the executor's petition was-pending in the Tax Court, he obtained a probate
court ruling that the partial release was invalid under state law. After the Tax
Court and Second Circuit 9 followed the state court's position on the validity of
the partial release, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Second Circuit
for reconsideration under the "proper regard" standard." On remand, the Second
Circuit, in a two-sentence per curiam opinion, concluded that the highest court of
the state "would not follow the decision of the [probate court], but instead would
uphold the partial release of the general power of appointment.""
United States v. Bosurgie' involved a dispute over estate taxes allegedly owed
by the estate of a nonresident alien who died owning a custodial account in a United
States bank. In prior litigation, an intermediate state appellate court awarded
summary judgment which (1) ordered decedent's sons' attorney to hold in trust the
proceeds obtained in a settlement from the bank for alleged mismanagement of the
securities transferred to their custodial account at the bank from their mother's
account; and (2) upheld a foreign corporation's claim that it was the rightful owner
of the funds held by the sons' attorney. The district court stated that although the
government was "fully aware" of, and had "informally participated" in, the state
court proceedings, it was not a "formal party" to the litigation.53 As a result, under
Bosch, although the state court decisions were not controlling on the district court,
they were entitled to "proper regard."'
However, the district court indicated that the state court proceedings only were
entitled to "proper regard" because the government failed to prove that the state
court proceedings were collusive.55 The district court stated that in these circum-
stances, "since such interests as judicial economy are enhanced by allowing
competent State tribunals to decide issues of State law," it was appropriate "to give
considerable regard" to the state court decisions.' The district court then
47. Estate of Bosch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 120, 121 (1964).
48. Id. at 123-24.
49. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1966).
50. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 466 (1967).
51. Estate of Bosch, 382 F.2d at 295.
52. 530 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 1976), affg in part & rev'g in part 389 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
53. United States v. Bogursi, 389 F. Supp. 1088, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
54. Id. at 1091.
55. Id. The district court in Bosurgi cited pre-Bosch case law for this proposition. Flitcroft v.
Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1964). The district court emphasized that the government
had notice of the state court proceedings and accused the government of "grasping at straws in order to
avoid the consequences of its refusal to walk across the street to the [state] Courthouse." Bosurgi, 389
F. Supp. at 1093 n.5.
56. d. at 1093 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1091 (stating that it is appropriate to give
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examined the evidence before the state court, concluded that it had correctly applied
state law, and granted defendants' motion for summary judgmentY In its Action
on Decision58 recommending appeal, the Service argued that the district court erred
in following the intermediate state appellate court's decision because "a federal court
should give little, if any, weight to a state court action that is not a genuine
adversary proceeding." 9
The Second Circuit held that the district court improperly gave "great weight" to
the state court decisions.' The Second Circuit stated that "economy of judicial
resources and avoidance of conflicting results would not appear to be served by
giving controlling effect to the [state court] adjudication" on these facts." The
Second Circuit stated that under Bosch,
even if due regard is accorded to the state court's adjudication, it would
only be as valid as its evidentiary base. We have not hesitated to
disregard state court judgments affecting federal tax liability where the
factual questions involved were not contested in the state court, or
where a lower state court made an erroneous application of state law.6'
The Second Circuit concluded that even if the state court determinations were given
"proper regard," they did not compel a grant of federal summary judgment. The
summary judgment motion in state court was unopposed and the state court did not
have before it the conflicting evidence submitted by the government in the federal
litigation because it was not a party to the state proceedings.'
In Magavern v. United States,' the Service served a notice of levy to a trustee
to collect unpaid taxes owed by one of the trust's beneficiaries. The trustee attacked
the levy's validity in probate court, and the probate court concluded that the
beneficiary did not have a property interest in the trust.' Armed with the probate
court decision, the trustee brought suit in federal district court to quash the levy on
the ground that the probate court's construction of the will was binding on the
Service.' Relying on Bosch, the district court rejected the trustee's position
because it would result in "questions of federal tax liability [being] routinely and
"considerable weight" to state court decisions).
57. Id. at 1092.
58. Action on Decision, No. CC-1975-140 (May 2, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, AOD File).
59. Id. at *3 (citing Bath v. United States, 480 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene v. United States,
476 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1973)).
60. United States v. Bosurgi, 530 F.2d 1105, 1112 (2d Cir. 1976).
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. 550 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1977), affg 415 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
826 (1977).
65. Id. at 799 (citing In re Will of Duncan, 362 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sur. Ct. 1974)).
66. The Service had notice of the state court proceeding and made a special appearance to contest
the state court's jurisdiction; the Service did not argue the merits of the case. Magavern v. United States,
415 F. Supp. 217, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
conclusively decided by lower state courts.'67 Instead, the district court stated that
it was not bound by the probate court's decision, but would "consider" it because
there were no other state court decisions directly on point."e After examining the
probate court's decision and engaging in an independent review of state law, the
district court held, contrary to the probate court, that the beneficiary had a property
interest in the trust under state law, thus upholding the validity of the Service's
levy.'
The Second Circuit rejected the trustee's argument that the probate court's
construction of the will was binding on the federal courts."0 The Second Circuit
noted that, under Bosch, "a lower state court decision was a significant factor for a
federal court in ascertaining state law, but federal tribunals should not consider lower
state court decisions binding where the highest state court has not spoken on the
point." Although the trustee tried to distinguish its case from Bosch based on the
Service's appearance in the state probate court, the Second Circuit emphasized the
limited nature of the Service's appearance merely to contest the probate court's
jurisdiction.' The Second Circuit stated that under the Bosch "proper regard"
standard, "[t]he district court, a decision by the highest court of [the state] lacking,
was thus required to sit 'as a state court' to decide the case as might a state tribunal,
giving proper consideration to the ruling of the [probate] court."73 After an
independent review of state law, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the probate court had misapplied state law, that the beneficiary had
a property interest in the trust under state law, and that the Service's levy was
valid.74
In Lemle v. United States,75 wife received payments from her life interest in a
portion of the net income generated by the residue of her late husband's estate. The
executors reported the payments as distributions of income to a will beneficiary and
thus deducted the payments on the estate's income tax returns. Wife treated the
payments as distributions from estate principal in anticipation of receiving her
elective share under state law and thus did not report the payments on her income tax
returns. The Service assessed a deficiency against wife for failure to report the
distributions as income.76
Wife's right to an elective share was unclear because she had signed an antenuptial
agreement waiving her right to elect against husband's will. In a probate court
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 219-21.
70. Magavern, 550 F.2d at 801.
71. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 798.
73. Id. at 801 (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 456 (1967)).
74. Id. at 801-02. In dissent, Judge Oakes did not take issue with the majority's formulation of the
Bosch standard. Instead, Judge Oakes argued that the majority, like the district court, had misapplied
state law. Id. at 802-04 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
75. 579 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1978), affg 419 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. Lemle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 68, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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proceeding pursuant to a settlement reached between the estate and wife in which the
estate acknowledged wife's right to a surviving spouse's elective share, the probate
court ruled that the payments constituted payments of principal to wife in satisfaction
of her elective share. Although the settlement required the estate's accountants to
prepare amended tax returns for the estate and the other beneficiaries reflecting this
treatment of the payments, such returns were never filed' After denying wife's
motion for summary judgment, the district court, contrary to the probate court, treated
the payments as income.7
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the probate court had
misapplied state law in treating the payments as distributions of principal. The
Second Circuit stated that the probate court's adoption of the settlement agreement
was not binding on the district court.' Despite citing Bosch, the Second Circuit
relied on the nonadversarial nature of the probate court proceeding as evidence that
the probate court decision did not result in a "contested construction of state law."'"
In Estate of Foster v. Commissioner,' wife received from husband's estate a life
interest and a lifetime power to invade principal, with the remainder left to her
children. The probate court concluded that wife possessed an unlimited power to
consume the principal under state law, and the estate reported wife's interest as a life
estate coupled with a general power of appointment qualifying her for the marital
deduction under section 2056(b)(5). The Tax Court rejected the marital deduction on
the ground that wife did not possess an unlimited power to consume because the
power was limited by the good faith standard under state law.' The Tax Court
stated that "with all due respect" to the probate court, it could not under Bosch
"automatically accept" the probate court's decision in light of its contrary view of
state law.? In affirming, the Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's interpreta-
tion of state law without citing Bosch or referring to the probate court's decision.'
D. Third Circuit
Forty-five cases in the Third Circuit cite Bosch, but only three are tax cases.' In
77. Id. at 70.
78. Id. at 73.
79. Lemle, 579 F.2d at 187.
80. Id. at 188.
81. Id. (citing Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827
(1975)). The Second Circuit emphasized that the compromise agreement in the state court "did not truly
reflect what the successful outcome of litigation would have established." Id.
82. 725 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1984), affg 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 679 (1983).
83. Estate of Foster v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 679, 681 (1983).
84. Md. at 682.
85. Estate of Foster, 725 F.2d at 202-04.
86. Two nontax cases gave conflicting interpretations of the binding effect of state intermediate
appellate court determinations in subsequent federal litigation. In Lair v. Fauver, 595 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.
1979), the Third Circuit indicated that Bosch required federal courts to give "proper regard" to state
intermediate appellate court decisions. Id. at 913-14 & n.9. However, in the earlier case of Springfield
State Bank v. National State Bank, 459 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1972), the Third Circuit contended that "it is
well settled that where, as here, state law governs, a federal court may not decline to accept a rule
19931
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the only two tax cases that involved a prior state court proceeding,87 the Third
Circuit viewed the "proper regard" standard as requiring plenary review. In the first
case, the Third Circuit concluded that the state court had correctly applied state law.
In the second case, the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion a Tax Court decision
holding that the state court had misapplied state law.
In Estate of Leggett v. United States," husband died in 1909 and bequeathed a
life estate in corporate stock to his wife, leaving the remainder to their children. Until
her death fifty-one years later, wife managed the stock (including subsequent stock
dividends and stock splits), which she kept registered in her name as executrix of
husband's estate. Wife kept a complete set of books which credited the original stock
as well as the subsequent stock dividends and stock splits to husband's estate. Wife's
estate tax return did not include the value of the stock dividends and stock splits.
While wife's estate tax return was being audited, her executor obtained a ruling from
the probate court that (1) the stock dividends and stock splits belonged to husband's
estate, and (2) a debtor-creditor relationship did not exist between wife and husband's
estate."' Despite the probate court's ruling, the Service included the stock dividends
and stock splits in wife's estate.'
The Service argued in district court that wife was a debtor to the remaindermen
under state law for the value of the stock at the time she received it. Under this
view, the stock dividends and stock splits received during her lifetime were her
property and thus includible in her estate. In contrast, the executor argued that wife
held the original securities, subsequent stock dividends, and stock splits as trustee for
the remaindermen. Under this view, the dividends and stock splits were not her
property and thus were not includible in her estate." The district court noted that,
under Bosch, it was not bound by the decision of the probate court,' but instead
was required to follow the decisions of the highest court of the state in determining
wife's property interests.93 After an independent review of state law, the district
court found, contrary to the probate court, that husband's will established a debtor-
creditor relationship under state law between wife and the remaindermen. As a
result, the district court agreed with the Service that the stock dividends and stock
announced by a court of intermediate appeal deciding a state question." Id. at 718. The Third Circuit
cited only pre-Bosch authority for this proposition and distinguished Bosch on the dubious ground that
"[tlhat case involved federal estate tax liability and presented a federal question." Id.
87. The other tax case is Miller v. United States, 387 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'g 267 F. Supp.
182 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
88. 418 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1969), rev'g 293 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
89. The Service received notice of the probate court proceeding but did not appear. Id. at 1258.
90. Estate of Leggett v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 22, 23-24 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
91. Id.
92. The district court observed that "[iut is a reasonable inference that [wife's executor] sought a
ruling from the [probate court] in preparation for future negotiations with the Commissioner." Id. at 24.
The district court drew this inference from two facts: (1) the executor instituted the probate court
proceeding while the Service was auditing the estate; and (2) the questions addressed by the probate court
were not necessary for settling either husband's or wife's estate. Id. at 24-25.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Id. at 25.
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splits were properly includible in wife's estate.95
The Third Circuit reversed. After noting that "[t]he apparatus of two trial courts,
one state and one federal, [had] been employed to resolve this issue," the Third
Circuit agreed that the district court under Bosch "was free to differ from the
conclusion reached by the state court.' 9 However, the Third Circuit engaged in its
own de novo review of state law and held that the state court had correctly
concluded that there was no debtor-creditor relationship between wife and the
remaindermen.' As a result, the stock dividends and stock splits were not
includible in wife's estate.
In Estate of Hamilton v. Commissioner,9 husband upon his death left a portion
of his estate in trust, with a life inconle interest to wife and then to sister, and the
remainder at sister's death to be distributed to his two nephews. One of the nephews
survived wife's death but predeceased sister. The tax question at nephew's death was
whether his remainder interest was vested, and thus includible in his estate, or
contingent and not includible. After the tax controversy arose, nephew's executor
obtained a ruling from the probate court that the nephew possessed only a
contingent remainder at the time of his death.
The Tax Court noted that, under Bosch, it was required to construe nephew's will
in accordance to what it perceived state law to be, "rather than simply accept the
construction arrived at by the [probate court]."" Although the Tax Court did so
"with some trepidation,""' it concluded after a de novo review of state law that
the highest state court "would very probably have overruled the [probate court's]
determination.". The Tax Court also noted that the adversary nature of the
probate court proceeding was not a "controlling factor" under the "proper regard"
standard." The Third Circuit affirmed without issuing a published opinion." 3
E. Fourth Circuit
Of the twenty Fourth Circuit cases that cite Bosch, nine are tax cases. 4 Three
95. Id.
96. Estate of Leggett, 418 F.2d at 1258.
97. The Third Circuit held that "by her conduct, [wife] renounced and disclaimed the rights of
dominion, control, and ownership of which she could have availed herself in a debtor-creditor
relationship, and that she constituted herself a fiduciary for the remaindermen with their full consent."
Id. at 1260. The Third Circuit agreed with the state court's conclusion that wife's conduct over 51 years
demonstrated she intentionally waived her right as income beneficiary to receive stock dividends and
stock splits. Id. at 1260-61.
98. 577 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1978), affg mer. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1609 (1976).
99. Estate of Hamilton v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1609, 1614 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1613.
103. Estate of Hamilton v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1978) (Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions).
104. One of the nontax cases is a habeas case in which an intermediate state appellate court had
rejected the prisoner's double jeopardy claim on the ground that his conduct constituted multiple offenses
under state law. State v. Sanderson, 300 S.E.2d 9, 15-16 (N.C. App.), review denied, 304 S.E.2d 759
(N.C. 1983). In Sanderson v. Rice, 777 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027 (1986),
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of the nine tax cases involved a prior state proceeding." However, none of these
the district court grantel habeas relief based on its conclusion that the conduct did not constitute multiple
offenses under state law, despite the contrary intermediate state court ruling. The Fourth Circuit reversed
and, after an independent review of state law, held that the state court had correctly applied state law.
Id. at 903.
The Fourth Circuit noted at the outset of its opinion that "[a] federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding should be cautious in setting aside the judgment of a state court where that judgment is based
on an interpretation of state law." Id. at 904. However, the Fourth Circuit stated that an inquiry into state
law was appropriate here because, under Bosch, the intermediate state court proceeding was not
"binding": "An opinion of an intermediate appellate court is persuasive in situations where the highest
state court has not spoken but does not prevail where the federal court is convinced that the highest court
of the state would rule to the contrary." Id. at 905 (footnote omitted). After a lengthy de novo review
of state law, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the state court had correctly held that the conduct
constituted multiple offenses under state law. Id. at 905-08. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that six state
court judges, "well inftrmed on the [state] law, have seen the matter one way," and the highest court of
the state had denied review; in these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit was "loath" to give the habeas
petitioner "further review in federal courts not substantively different from another appeal in the state
judicial system." Id. at 908.
105. The other sb. tax cases are Estate of Casey v. Commissioner, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'g 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 176 (1989); Estate of Reno v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'g
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 909 (1986), superseded on rehearing by 945 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1991) (en bane);
Wisely v. United States, 893 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1990), affig 703 F. Supp. 474 (V.D. Va. 1988); Boyter
v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981), remanding 74 T.C. 989 (1980); United States v. Ritter,
558 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir 1977), rev'g 416 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); Guiney v. United States, 425
F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'g 295 F. Supp. 789 (D. Md. 1969).
In Boyter, husband uid wife obtained a year-end divorce in a foreign country so they could file their
tax returns as unmarried individuals, and then remarried in January of the following year. The Tax Court
concluded that marital status was governed by state law. Because the state's courts had not determined
the validity of foreign divorce decrees, the Tax Court relied on Bosch in stating that it "must choose the
rule we believe the highest State court would adopt if faced with the question." Boyter v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 989, 995 (1980). After a lengthy examination of state law, the Tax Court concluded that the
highest court of the state would not recognize a foreign divorce decree where the parties were not
domiciled in the foreign country. Id. at 997.
The Fourth Circuit noted at the outset that given the uncertain state law, it "ordinarily" would certify
the state law question to the highest court of the state (the state statute did not permit certification from
the Tax Court). Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1385. However, certification was not appropriate until the Tax Court
first determined, as a matter of federal law, whether the divorce should be disregarded under the sham
transaction doctrine even if it were respected by the state courts. Id. at 1385-88. In dissent, Judge
Widener cited Bosch in arguing that this was a "classic opportunity" to invoke the state's certification
procedures "so that we may actually decide a case at hand instead of deciding as we are bound to do
what the opinion of a State court of last resort would be." Id. at 1388 (Widener, J., dissenting).
In Ritter, the enforceability of a federal tax lien controversy turned on whether decedent retained a
reversion or created a remainder interest in trust property. United States v. Ritter, 416 F. Supp. 777, 781
(S.D. W. Va. 1976). Because the highest court of the state had not addressed this issue, the district court
stated it was its "duty to make an 'informed prediction of what (this) state's highest court would decide
if the (instant) case were before it.'" Id. (quoting Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 350 F. Supp. 949, 951
(S.D. W. Va. 1972)). After reviewing state law, the district court concluded that "it is the prediction of
this Court that the [higLiest state court] would hold that the provisions of the trust agreement, as amended,
created a remainder in the trust estate." Id. at 784.
Although the Fourth Circuit deferred to the district judge's "experience and expertise in the law of his
own state," Ritter, 558 F.2d at 1166, it reversed on the ground that the federal tax lien was enforceable
regardless of whether the property interest was a reversion or a remainder under state law. Id. In a
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cases applied the "proper regard" standard. One case did not involve the application
of state law because the federal tax issue concerned the deductibility of administra-
tion expenses."° Another case did not cite Bosch in affirming a lower court
decision that had taken a view of state law different from the lower state court. The
remaining case applied the same standard of review to a state tax administrative
agency's application of state law that would be applied by the highest court of the
state in reviewing the agency's decision, and concluded that the agency had properly
applied state law.
In Sappington v. United States,"W the federal tax issue was whether wife had
received 4 life estate in certain property under the will of her late husband who had
died over thirty years earlier (in which case it would not be included in her estate)
or had purchased the property from her husband's estate (in which case it would be
included in her estate). A probate court had approved the sale shortly after
husband's death, and wife's executors included the property in her estate. However,
in a suit against the executors, the trustee under wife's will obtained a ruling from
the probate court that wife had received a life estate under husband's will. The
executors then instituted a refund action in federal district court. After the complaint
was filed, the highest state court affirmed the probate court's ruling that wife had
received a life estate under husband's will. In the course of its decision, the court
stated that wife had received the property at issue as a life tenant under husband's
will. Despite this ruling, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held that wife
had purchased the property from husband's estate.
The district court focused on the earlier probate court approval of the sale and
concurrence joined by Judge Williams, Judge Widener stated that "the district court applied the wrong
State law and that the [highest state court], if called upon to decide this case, would find the [decision
of the highest court of another state] to be the persuasive precedent, and would reach the same result we
reach here." Id. at 1168 (Widener, J., concurring) (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967)).
106. In Estate of Love v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991), affg 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1479
(1989), decedent at the time of her death was engaged in the business of breeding and racing
thoroughbred horses. Three months before her death, she had entered into an agreement to have one of
her mares (located in France) bred by a stallion. Because decedent's will directed that her foreign
operations be liquidated, her executor paid $150,000 to extinguish the agreement and treated the payment
as an administration expense. The probate court approved the payment as an administration expense
under state law. Id. at 336 n.3. The probate court's application of state law was not at issue in the federal
tax litigation because both the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit did not treat the payment as a valid
administration expense under federal law. Id. at 338.
The Tax Court agreed that the payment was necessary to the administration of the estate but
concluded that the payment was not an "expense" of administration; instead, the payment was a
nondeductible outlay for an addition to the estate. Estate of Love v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH)
1479, 1483 (1989). In affirming, the Fourth Circuit held that the deductibility of the payment was
controlled by federal law rather than state law. Estate of Love, 923 F.2d at 338. The Fourth Circuit stated
that Bosch "undergirded" this conclusion: "[A]ny state court decision regarding this matter, whether
based on federal or state law, would not bind a federal tribunal." Id. (citing Caron, Reformulating
Complementary Roles, supra note 44, at 986).
107. 408 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1969), affig 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,514 (D. Md. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 876 (1969).
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contended that the later state court litigation concerned only whether wife had
received a life estate in property in fact distributed to wife, not whether wife had
received the property at issue by distribution or by sale. As a result, "the factual
issue here was never presented to that Court for decision.""' The district court
emphasized the nonadversary nature of the later probate court proceeding: although
the trustee's complaint alleged that wife had received the property at issue by
distribution, these allegations "were admitted by the defendants in the state court
proceeding (who are the plaintiffs in this action and who had much to gain in
agreeing to such facts)."''  The district court concluded that the Bosch "proper
regard" standard was not implicated here because there was no factual determination
by the probate court: "[t]he crucial fact was admitted in the pleadings by parties
who had much to gain from such admissions.""' Without citing Bosch, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that wife acquired the property as
purchaser from husband's estate rather than as a life tenant under husband's will."'
In Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner,"' the issue was whether an executor had
validly disclaimed decedent's interest under state law in certain pre-1982 joint
property interests. After audit of decedent's state inheritance tax return, the state
department of revenue concluded that the disclaimers were valid under state law and
thus not subject to state inheritance tax. The Tax Court noted that under Bosch it
"must determine, as best we can, what the highest court of [the state] would hold
on the question of state law which is presented.""' The Tax Court did not give
any weight to the state agency's interpretation of state law. After a de novo review,
the Tax Court then concluded that the disclaimer was not valid under state law and
that the highest court of the state, "if faced with the question, would so hold."".
The Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that the Tax Court correctly began its
analysis under Bach "by surveying applicable [state] law to determine the validity
of the disclaimer.""' However, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[iln the absence of
judicial and legislative guidance, diligent inquiry should include a review of
applicable administrative determinations..... The Fourth Circuit then elaborated on
the appropriate level of deference to give to the state agency's interpretation of state
law.
The Fourth Circuit first cited with approval language from a D.C. Circuit case
holding that a federal court was not "at liberty to overthrow" a state administrative
agency's interpretation of state law because it was the role of the state courts to say
whether the agency's interpretation was incorrect, even where the agency's
108. Sappington v. United States, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,514, at 87,337 (D. Md. 1968).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Sappington, 408 F.2d at 818-19.
112. 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'g 89 T.C. 550 (1987).
113. Estate of Dacy v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 550, 557 (1987).
114. Id. at 560.
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interpretation "was at odds with the language of the [state] statute.""' 7 The Fourth
Circuit stated that it was "appropriate" for it to accept the agency's application of
state law here, unless it concluded that the highest court in the state would reject
the agency's ruling."' In making this determination the Fourth Circuit looked at
two canons of statutory construction applied by the state's courts in tax cases: (1)
absent contrary legislative intent, tax statutes were construed against the state and
in favor of the taxpayer; and (2) the agency's construction of a tax statute, although
not binding, would be given "due consideration" by a reviewing court."' Applica-
tion of these canons "persuade[d]" the Fourth Circuit that the highest court of the
state would uphold the agency's recognition of the validity of the disclaimer:
The Department of Revenue is the agency most suited to determine
whether a disclaimer of a survivorship interest in jointly held personal
property is valid under [state] law for tax purposes. Its ruling is not
arbitrary or capricious, and we believe that it would not be disturbed
by the [highest court of the state]. In absence of contrary authority, we
conclude that [wife's] disclaimer is valid under [state] law."w
F. Fifth Circuit
Thirteen of the twenty-five Fifth Circuit cases that cite Bosch are tax cases.''
However, five of the tax cases did not directly consider the deference that federal
courts must give to a state court's interpretation of state law in a federal tax
case." In the remaining eight tax cases, the Fifth Circuit viewed the "proper
regard" standard as requiring de novo review of the probate court's application of
state law. In six of these cases, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the probate court
had misapplied state law. The Fifth Circuit relied on the nonadversariness of the
state proceeding in reaching this conclusion in two of those six cases. In the only
case to hold that the probate court had correctly applied state law, a two-judge
majority concluded that the "proper regard" standard required a federal court to
117. Id. at 86.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting In re North Carolina Inheritance Taxes, 277 S.E.2d 403, 407 (N.C. 1981)).
120. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
121. In Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass'n, 585 F.2d 765, 776-78 (5th Cir. 1978), modified,
594 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit first abstained from deciding whether the selection
procedure for state board of health membership violated state and federal law, pending resolution of state
court litigation between the parties. The Fifth Circuit later followed an intermediate state appellate court's
resolution of the state law issues because, under Bosch, the Fifth Circuit was not "'convinced by other
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Finch v. Mississippi State
Medical Ass'n, 594 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456, 465 (1967) (emphasis deleted) (quoting in turn West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940))).
122. Central Oil & Supply Corp. v. United States, 557 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1977); Dahlgreen v.
United States, 553 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1977); Estate of Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir.
1971); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970); Dodge v. United States, 413 F.2d 1239
(5th Cir. 1969).
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determine, from existing state court precedent, whether the state supreme court
would have affirmed the probate court's decree had there been an appeal.
In Cox v. United States," widow elected against her husband's will and took
her dower rights and distributive share of the estate. The probate court calculated
widow's marital share to include the commuted value of her dower interest and
charged the entire estate tax to the nonmarital portion of the estate. The district
court agreed with the Service's view that the dower rights were nondeductible
terminable interests and that a portion of the estate tax was properly chargeable
against the marital portion of the estate. The district court held that, under Bosch,
federal courts are not bound by state trial court determinations, especially where
"the trial court ha'; created an apportionment statute by judicial fiat, something both
the higher [state] courts and the [state] legislature have not done."1 4
After an independent review of state law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling that the probate court had mischaracterized widow's dower interest as
a nonterminable interest under state law." However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling that the probate court had improperly charged the entire estate
tax against the ncnmarital portion of the estate."
In Risher v. United States,' father died leaving a will that disinherited his
adopted daughter. Under the state pretermitted heir statute, the adoption of a child
revoked the adoptive parent's preexisting will and allowed the adopted child to take
his or her intestacy share of the adoptive parent's estate. The probate court applied
a state statute that distributed one-third of decedent's personal property to the
adopted child and two-thirds to decedent's wife. The probate court refused to apply
another state statute that would have divided decedent's personal property equally
between wife and adopted daughter. The estate computed the marital deduction
based on the probate court's decree (two-thirds to wife), while the Service
determined the marital deduction based on the statute the probate court had refused
to apply (one-half to wife)."
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Service that the
probate court had applied the wrong state statute. The district court stated that,
under Bosch, "this court is not bound by another trial court's interpretation of the
state law in the absence of an authoritative ruling from the State Supreme
Court."'" However, the district court noted that its decision was limited to the
marital deduction question and that it did not intend "by this decree in any way to
123. 421 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970), revg 296 F. Supp. 145 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
124. Cox v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 145, 147 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
125. Cox, 421 F.2d at 577-83.
126. Id. at 583-85. Because the state supreme court had never addressed this issue, the Fifth Circuit
noted that it had "to determine as best it can what the [state] courts would decide." Id. at 583. After a
plenary review of state law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the probate court's decision matched "what
the [state] courts would decide." Id.
127. 465 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), affg 339 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
128. Risher v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 484, 485-87 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
129. Id. at 488.
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sit as an appellate court nor reverse the [probate court's] decision on the distribution
of the estate."'3
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit relied on Bosch in rejecting the estate's argument that
the probate court had conclusively established the state law question.13 ' After an
independent review of state law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "examination of
the relevant [state] statutes and case law discloses that the district court was on solid
ground in its interpretation of [state] law."'
The Fifth Circuit characterized Bath v. United States'33 as "a square peg that
will not fit into any neat, round tax hole."'' In that case, mother's will provided
one-third outright to older son (who was also her executor) and one-third each in
trust to younger son and daughter, with older son as trustee. In light of family
animosity,' younger son was unwilling to let his brother act as trustee over his
one-third interest. As a result, younger son challenged mother's will on a variety of
grounds; he alleged that mother was incompetent, subject to undue influence from
older son, and failed to provide an agreed upon compensation for services that
younger son had provided to mother over a twenty-five year period."
After a brief probate court hearing in which older son "tacitly waived opposition"
by failing to assert several substantive defenses to younger son's claims, the probate
court entered judgment in favor of younger son based on a settlement agreed to by
the parties that gave younger son his one-third interest free of the trust.'37 The
estate and younger son treated the settlement inconsistently on their separate returns:
the estate treated it as compensation for services by deducting the payment as a
claim against the estate while younger son treated it as a nontaxable inheritance.
3
1
In the district court litigation involving younger son's return, both sons agreed that
there were no uncompensated services outstanding at the time of mother's death
because younger son had received a salary as he had performed these services.
Younger son testified that "the simulation of adversary litigation was necessary
because of [older son's] duty as executor to defend the provisions of the will naming
130. Id.
131. Risher, 465 F.2d at 2.
132. Id. at 4.
133. 480 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973).
134. Id.
135. Younger son testified in the district court that he feared arbitrary treatment by older son acting
as trustee. For example, younger son stated that he had been the victim of such arbitrary treatment in
a lifetime trust set up by mother with older brother as trustee. In addition, younger son testified that older
son had threatened him: "If you do just exactly like I tell you ... I will give you a little of [the
testamentary trust]." Id. at 290. For his part, when older son learned of the will challenge, his first




138. Id. at 292 n.3; see also Estate of Bath v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 493 (1975).
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[younger son's] children as remaindermen."'39 The jury found that the payment
was a nontaxable inheritance to younger son."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the government's motions
for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Although the
Fifth Circuit cited the Bosch holding that federal authorities are not bound by
determinations of state law made by a state trial court, the Fifth Circuit relied on
the adversary proceeding test: "Especially suspect are characterizations, such as we
have here, not the result of bona fide adversary proceedings.. 41 The Fifth Circuit
examined the evidence and concluded that although there was a "strong likelihood"
that the older son's defenses would have prevailed had there been "genuine
opposition" in a "true adversary proceeding" in the probate court, there was a
sufficient conflict in the evidence to present a jury question. 42
In Wiles v. Commissioner,' father transferred one-third interests in two medical
office buildings to his three children, ostensibly in trust with father as trustee. The
same day, father, acting as trustee, leased the buildings to himself for a ten-year
period. The trusts were poorly worded, and apparently a question arose whether the
property had been transferred to children outright or to father as trustee of trusts for
the benefit of children. Father obtained a state court decree reforming the trusts to
make clear that h- held title to the property as trustee. However, after the Service
questioned father's rental expense deduction, the children obtained a second state
court decree that vacated the first decree and held that children held title to the
property outright. The Tax Court rejected children's attempt to support father's
rental deduction, concluding that the second state court had misapplied state law and
that father held title to the property as trustee.'" The Fifth Circuit affirmed in an
unpublished decision.
45
In Estate of Salter v. Commissioner," husband's will provided for his estate to
go to wife, "with any residual after her death to my hereinafter named children in
equal parts."'47 Wife filed a petition in probate court seeking that the above
language be construed as giving wife a life estate with a general power of
appointment so that the bequest would qualify for the marital deduction. Decedent's
139. Bath, 480 F.2d at 290-91.
140. Id. at 290.
141. Id. at 292.
142. Id. In the related litigation, the Tax Court also treated the settlement as an inheritance rather
than as compensation. Echoing the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the Tax Court stated "that there was no real
contest of [younger son's probate court] suit, that [the Tax Court] is not bound by the judgment of the
[probate] court, and tikat the result reached by [the probate] court would have been unreasonable had the
facts been presented to the [probate] court." Estate of Bath, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 504. The Tax Court
denied the deduction as a claim against the estate because the court determined that mother had
adequately compensated younger son for the work he had performed during mother's life. Id. at 505-06.
143. 491 F.2d 14 6 (5th Cir. 1974), affig mem 59 T.C. 289 (1972).
144. Wiles v. Ccmmissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 296-97 (1972).
145. Wiles v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974) (Table of Decisions Without Reported
Opinions).
146. 545 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'g 63 T.C. 537 (1975).
147. Estate of Sadter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 537, 538 (1975).
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children joined the petition and agreed to be bound by the probate court's decree.
The probate court granted wife's petition. The Service disallowed the claimed
marital deduction."
The Tax Court noted that although the probate court had interpreted husband's
will to meet the requirements of the marital deduction, the parties agreed that, under
Bosch, the probate court's interpretation of the will was not controlling. After
examining state law, the Tax Court concluded that the state supreme court, contrary
to the probate court's ruling, would hold that wife received only a life estate with
a limited power of disposition.149
The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that, under Bosch,
a federal court will look to the state's highest court as the best authority
on its own law, but, significantly, in the absence of authoritative rulings
from that source the federal court must apply what it finds to be the
state law "after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts
of the State." Stated another way: in the process of finding state law if
there is a controlling decision of the state's highest court, the federal
courts must follow it; if there is none, we may give proper regard to
relevant rulings of lesser state courts."5
The Fifth Circuit then explained the required degree of deference to be accorded the
probate court's decision under the "proper regard" test: "In the absence of a case
specifically in point, the best measure of that 'regard', we think, would be to
determine, from existing precedent, in our best judgment, whether the [state]
Supreme Court... would have affirmed the [probate court's] decree had there been
an appeal." ' After an independent review of state law, the Fifth Circuit conclud-
ed that the Tax Court had erroneously held that the probate court had misapplied
state law; the Fifth Circuit was "convinced that had there been an appeal the [state]
Supreme Court... would have affirmed the decree of the [probate court], holding
that the will of the decedent conferred upon his widow an absolute, unqualified right
of disposition."''
148. Id. at 540.
149. Id. at 542. The Tax Court also concluded that the children could not disclaim their interest.
Id. at 546.
150. Estate of Salter, 545 F.2d at497 (quoting Conmissionerv. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456,465
(1967)). The Fifth Circuit also noted that "[o]rdinarily, the determination of local law by a federal Court
of Appeals will be accepted by the Supreme Court." Id.
151. Id. at 500.
152. Id. at 501. Although the Fifth Circuit, in the nontax case of Finch, did not cite Estate of Salter,
both cases support focusing on how the state supreme court would decide the issue See discussion supra
note 121. However, Finch suggests that greater deference may be appropriate where the state court
decision is that of an intermediate appellate state court in light of the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the
quotation from Bosch that the federal court will follow the intermediate appellate state court "unless it
is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise."' Finch
v. Mississippi State Medical Ass'n, 594 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465
(emphasis deleted) (quoting in turn West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940))).
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Godbold refused to join in the majority's
formulation of the required deference that a federal court must give to a probate
court decision under the "proper regard" test. Instead, Judge Godbold would have
treated a series of cases from the state supreme court as dispositive "without having
to reach and rely upon the [probate court] decree construing the will and our
projection of what the [state] Supreme Court would have decided had the decree
been appealed."'"
In Newman v. Internal Revenue Service," decedent's children purported to
disclaim their interest under decedent's will, thereby allowing their mother's interest
to qualify for the marital deduction. Although a probate court approved the
disclaimers, the parties stipulated that the disclaimers were invalid under state law
because they were. not filed within six months of decedent's death. The Tax Court
relied on this stipulation in concluding that wife's interest did not qualify for the
marital deduction, 5' and the Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion. 6
In Brown v. United States," husband and wife died within one year of each
other and probate was completed by 1971, but the estates remained open through
1989. The tax litigation concerned whether the estate or the beneficiaries should pay
tax on the income earned during this period."8 Section 641(a)(3) provides that
income is taxed to the estate when it is received by the estate during the "period of
administration."'59 The regulations provide that although the "period of administra-
tion" generally is the period actually required by the administrator or executor to
perform the ordinary duties of administration (e.g., collect assets, pay debts, taxes,
legacies, and bequests), the Service can treat an estate as terminated for federal
income tax purposies if it is "unduly prolonged.""xw
The Service determined that the administration of the estates had been "unduly
prolonged" and 2ssessed income tax deficiencies against the couple's son (the
executor and a beneficiary of his parents' estates) for 1978-82 on income previously
reported by the estates. Shortly after receiving the notice of deficiency, son obtained
a ruling from the probate court that the estates required ongoing management and
administration. Although there was no state law limitation on the length of the
estate's administration (absent objection from persons interested in the estate), the
probate court authorized son to keep the estates open until he determined "in his
sole discretion" that it would be in the best interests of the beneficiaries to close the
153. Estate of Sa'ter, 545 F.2d at 501 (Godbold, J., concurring). Although the Service believed that
the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly applied state law, it did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Action
on Decision, No. CC-1977-78 (June 7, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, AOD File).
154. 624 F.2d 1(06 (5th Cir. 1980), affg mer. Estate of Newman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M.
(CCH) 898 (1979).
155. Estate of Newman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 898, 900-01 (1979).
156. Newman v. Internal Revenue Serv., 624 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980) (Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions).
157. 890 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1989).
158. Id. at 1333.
159. I.R.C. § 641(a)(3) (1988).
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1960).
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estates. 6' Armed with this ruling, son sought an income tax refund in the district
court.
The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the Service had properly treated the estates as closed for federal income
tax purposes, despite the probate court ruling." The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting
that because the government was not a party to the probate court proceeding, under
Bosch, the ensuing order did not bind the government based on res judicata or
collateral estoppel principles."6 The Fifth Circuit then addressed the issue of "what
degree of deference the district court should have accorded this state judgment."''
The Fifth Circuit indicated that this issue can arise in two types of cases.
First, Bosch and similar cases involve a taxpayer whose federal tax liability turns
on the characterization of a property interest under state law. Although the "greatest
deference to state law is needed"'" in this type of case, Bosch "adopted an Erie
approach" in requiring only that the federal authorities give "proper regard" to a
lower state court's adjudication of the property interest and "need not accept such
rulings as conclusive."'" Second, where "the federal tax law establishes a uniform
criterion for taxing certain transactions or situations - irrespective of how state law
might label those transactions or situations - the decision of a state probate court
as to an underlying issue a fortiori should not be controlling."'67 The Fifth Circuit
noted that in both types of cases "a federal court must make its own inquiry into
relevant issues previously decided by a lower state court."'"
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the issue of whether the administration of an
estate has been unduly prolonged clearly fits within the second category as a
question of federal law. However, the Fifth Circuit stated that, even here,
because state law pervades every tax issue, it would not be accurate to
say that a federal court is free to simply ignore a state court's adjudica-
tion of relevant underlying facts. The relevance of a state court's
judgment to the resolution of a federal tax question will vary, depending
on the particular tax statute involved as well as the nature of the state
proceeding that produced the judgment.69
The Fifth Circuit then examined the nature of the probate court proceeding "to
evaluate the judgment's relevance to this tax refund case and to determine whether
the district court should have accorded it greater weight as an evidentiary
factor."'70 Returning (without citing) to the analysis in Bath, the Fifth Circuit
161. Brown, 890 F.2d at 1335.
162. Id. at 1333.






169. Id. at 1342.
170. Id.
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focused on various nonadversary characteristics of the probate court proceeding: (1)
the government was not a party; and (2) all potential beneficiaries agreed that son's
administration of the estate should continue (apparently because it was in their
economic interests to do so).' As support for its statement that "[f]ederal courts
have not looked favorably on taxpayer attempts to achieve post-death estate
planning by employing nonadversary probate court proceedings that are essentially
in the nature of consent decrees or advisory opinions,"'" the Fifth Circuit cited
only a dissenting opinion in Bosch and two pre-Bosch cases."
The Fifth Circuit concluded that in these circumstances, the probate court "was
not presented wiita all the relevant facts and differing views," and "the natural
tendency of a busy probate court is to accede to a proposed order without great
deliberation when all known interested parties are in agreement and when state
interests are not adversely affected."'74 As a result, the probate court's decision
was entitled to "little weight" in the district court because it merely "placed official
approval on actions that [son] could have legally pursued without the [probate]
court's direction" and "had no practical consequences apart from this federal tax
controversy."''
In Estate of Chagra v. Commissioner,7" decedent, a frequent and heavy gambler
at two Las Vegas hotels, died with $400,000 of outstanding debts owing to the two
hotels. Although the two hotels wrote off the gambling debts, the estate deducted
the debts as claims against the estate. The Service disallowed the deduction and,
one week before the Tax Court trial (and over nine years after the decedent's death),
the estate obtained probate court approval of the debts as claims against the estate.
The Tax Court concluded that the probate court misapplied state law because the
gambling debts were unenforceable." The Tax Court also relied on the
nonadversary nature of the probate court proceeding.' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
in an unpublished decision.'
G. Sixth Circuit
Although sixte,n Sixth Circuit cases cite Bosch, only four arose in a tax
setting."' Three of these cases considered the effect of a lower state court decision
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1342 n.15.
173. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 768,774-75 (M.D. Ala. 1959), affd, 285 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1961).
174. Brown, 890 F.2d at 1342.
175. Id.
176. 935 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1991), affg men. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1990).
177. Estate of Cbagra v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 104, 107 (1990).
178. Id. ("[P]etitioner's claims were filed ex parte. The probate court did not adjudicate anything
but merely approved petitioners uncontested document on the same day it was filed.").
179. Estate of Chagra v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1991) (Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions).
180. In Dennis v Railroad Retirement Bd., 585 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit gave
"'special deference' to a lower state court ruling in a Railroad Retirement Act case that turned on a
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in a subsequent federal tax controversy.' In the two cases that directly applied
Bosch, the Sixth Circuit construed the "proper regard" standard as requiring
independent review of the probate court's application of state law. In the first case,
the Sixth Circuit held that the probate court had correctly applied state law,
concluding that the highest court in the state would have affirmed the probate
court's decision and that the Service could not "second-guess" the probate court. In
the second case, the Sixth Circuit determined that the probate court had incorrectly
applied state law without discussing the likely outcome of appeal in the state court
system or the prohibition on "second-guessing." In the third case, the Sixth Circuit
did not directly consider Bosch and gave "total regard" to the probate court's
application of state lav when it refused to "entertain a collateral attack" to the
decision.
In Underwood v. United States," decedent's will limited the compensation of
his executors to 5% of the gross estate. The executors agreed to serve if they were
given additional compensation, and the probate court approved compensation of 8%.
The estate claimed an administration expense deduction for the full amount of the
compensation under section 2053(a)(2). The Service disallowed the portion of the
domestic relations issue. Id. at 154 (quoting Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1973)).
The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts must adhere to lower state court rulings if the following four
requirements are satisfied: (1) the precise issue under consideration was determined by a state court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) the state court proceeding was "genuinely contested"; (3) the issue is a
domestic relations issue; and (4) the state court ruling is consistent with state law as announced by the
highest court of the state. Id. This last requirement, in effect, requires a federal court to conduct a de
novo review of state law.
181. In the other case, Trent v. United States, 893 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'g 1990-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 60,008 (S.D. Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990), decedent's will established
a testamentary trust to fund alimony payments to his ex-wife. The balance of the trust income, as well
as the remainder, would be paid to their children. In an uncontested probate court proceeding, ex-wife
was granted an order modifying the alimony agreement to give her one-half of the value of the real estate
in the trust, less the alimony previously paid to her in lieu of her interest in the trust. The estate deducted
this amount as a claim against the estate under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3). The Commissioner challenged the
deduction on the ground that the modified alimony agreement did not create an enforceable debt under
state law.
The district court held that the state court judgment created a valid debt and thus constituted a
deductible claim against the estate. Trent v. United States, 1990-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 60,008, at
84,213 (S.D. Ohio 1987). The district court rejected the Service's argument under Bosch that "where the
Supreme Court of a state has not spoken the government is left free to interpret the property interest in
any manner it chooses." Instead, the district court interpreted Bosch to mean that if the probate court
decision "is an accurate expression of state law, it is binding on this court for federal tax purposes." Id.
The district court then conducted a de novo review of state law and concluded that although the highest
state court would have agreed with the probate court that the modified alimony agreement created an
enforceable debt under state law, it would have reduced the amount of the alimony. Id. at 84,213-15.
On appeal, the government renewed its argument that the modified alimony decree did not create a
deductible debt because, under Bosch, "the modified decree was not grounded on an enforceable right
under state law." Trent, 893 F.2d at 851. In reversing the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit stated
that it did not have to resolve this issue because the modified alimony decree was void under state law
as the probate court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 851-53.
182. 407 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1969), revg 270 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
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deduction in excess of 5% of the gross estate on the ground that the probate court
lacked authority to award compensation greater than that provided in the will.
The district court conducted a de novo review of state law and held that, under
Bosch, probate court decrees are not controlling and a federal court "is free to make
its own interpretation of state law[,] although decisions of other courts of the state
may be persuasive."" The district court held that the terms of the will controlled
the amount of the executors' compensation under state law.'"
The Sixth Circuit reversed. After quoting from Bosch and conducting its own
plenary review of state law, the Sixth Circuit differed with the district court's
interpretation of state law. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "[w]e believe that the
[state supreme court], given these facts, would have affirmed the action of the
probate court in allowing the executors' fees.""'u However, in the last sentence of
its opinion before the judgment, the Sixth Circuit cautioned that "the Government
should not be permitted to second-guess the probate court.""
In Krakoff v. United States,"' decedent's will left his entire estate to his wife.
The nonprobate assets included several bank accounts and some stock owned jointly
with his wife. Three months after decedent's death, wife renounced her rights as
sole beneficiary under the will and instead accepted her one-third statutory share as
surviving spouse. She then renounced her interest in the joint property, causing the
joint property to pass through the decedent's probate estate. As a result of wife's
election of her statatory share, the joint property passed one-third to wife and two-
thirds to the couple's children. Wife obtained a declaratory judgment from the
probate court confirming these effects of her renunciation of the joint property.'88
The Service argued that wife's renunciation of her right to the joint accounts was
not a valid disclaimer for gift tax purposes because it was ineffective under state
law." 9 As a result, the Service contended that she made a taxable gift of two-
thirds of the value of the joint property to the children. After an independent review
of state law, the district court granted the Service's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that where precedent from the highest court in the state contradicted
the probate court, a federal court under Bosch was not required to follow the
probate court's decision."' The district court did not cite Underwood or mention
any limitation on "second-guessing" the probate court.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed and, after conducting its own de novo review of state
law, agreed with the district court that the probate court's determination was
183. Underwood v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 389, 395 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
184. Id. at 395-96.
185. Underwood, 407F.2d at 611.
186. Id.
187. 439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971), affg 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970); see also Krakoff v.
United States, 431 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1970) (denying an interlocutory appeal requesting certification of
state law issue because Ohio had no certification procedure).
188. In re Krakoff, 179 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
189. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (as amended in 1986).
190. Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-94 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
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incorrect as a matter of state law. 9' Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit did
not cite Underwood, mention how the probate court's decision would have fared in
the state court system on appeal, or discuss the limitation on "second-guessing" the
probate court."
The tax question in Griffith v. Commissioner' was whether taxpayer's payments
to his ex-wife constituted deductible alimony or a nondeductible property settlement.
In the divorce action, the state trial court ordered a lump sum payment as a property
settlement which was affirmed by the state intermeliate appellate court. While an
appeal was pending in the state supreme court, the parties agreed to replace the
lump sum payment with monthly payments to be made over twelve years, ostensibly
to permit taxpayer to deduct the payments as alimony. The agreement was filed
with the state trial court and reported as its final judgment in the case. After a
review of the record and of state law, the Tax Court held that the subsequent
agreement did not change the status of the payments as a property settlement as
originally found by the state courts."
On appeal, taxpayer argued that the payments could not be a property settlement
because the couple lacked sufficient assets to support such a division. However, the
Sixth Circuit, without citing Bosch, refused to "entertain a collateral attack" on the
lower state courts' findings and affirmed the Tax Court's decision that the payments
constituted a property settlement rather than alimony. 5
H. Seventh Circuit
Although twenty-two Seventh Circuit cases cite Bosch, only four are tax-
related.' Three of these cases considered the effect of a lower state court decision
in a subsequent federal tax controversy."l Although the first case did not directly
191. Krakoff, 439 F.2d at 1025-28.
192. None of the later cases that cite Underwood mention the "second-guess" language. See Jeschke
v. United States, 814 F.2d 568, 577 (10th Cir. 1987); Oetting v. United States, 712 F.2d 358, 361 (8th
Cir. 1983); Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1981); Paris v. United
States, 381 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Estate of AhIstrom v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 220, 226
(1969).
193. 749 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1984), a.ffg 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 189 (1983).
194. Griffith v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, 191-92 & 192 n.5 (1983).
195. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the crucial question was whether the divorce
decree was intended as a property settlement, not whether the payments in fact actually effectuated a
property division between the spouses. Griffith, 749 F.2d at 14.
196. Two of the nontax cases are habeas cases in which there was a prior state court adjudication
of the defendant's guilt. In both cases, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Bosch "proper regard" standard
in engaging in a de novo review of a lower state court's application of state law.
In Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit "consider[ed]" an intermediate
state appellate court's application of state law. lId at 964. After a lengthy examination of state law, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the habeas petition had "fail[ed] to refute the conclusion of the
[intermediate state appellate court]." Id. at 965.
In Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit cited Bosch in refusing to
follow an intermediate state appellate court's interpretation of state law in the face of contrary (but
"dated") decisions of the state supreme court. Id. at 661-63.
197. The other case is White v. United States, 680 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1982).
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consider Bosch, th- Seventh Circuit adopted the Tax Court's opinion following the
interpretation of state law made by the highest court of the state. In the two tax
cases that directly applied Bosch, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the "proper regard"
standard as requiring plenary review and concluded that the probate court had
misapplied state law. In one case, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the
highest court of the state would have affirmed the probate court's decision had there
been an appeal and suggested that de novo review was particularly appropriate
where the probate court decision was not the product of an adversary proceeding.
In the other case, the Seventh Circuit employed independent review without
discussing the fate of the probate court's decision on appeal in the state court system
or the adversariness of the probate court proceeding.
In Hatt v. Commissioner,98 taxpayer married an older woman who gave him a
majority interest in a closely held business pursuant to an antenuptial agreement.
Wife's ex-husband had a preexisting consulting and noncompetition agreement
requiring the corporation to pay him a weekly salary. After making payments to ex-
husband for several years, the corporation, at taxpayer's urging, terminated the
agreement on the ground that the contract represented an improper use of corporate
assets to pay a property settlement incident to divorce. Ex-husband prevailed in a
state court breach of contract action, and the judgment was affirmed by the
intermediate state appellate court. The Service denied the corporation's claimed
business expense deduction for the payments to ex-husband on the same ground
unsuccessfully urged by the corporation in the state court proceedings. The Tax
Court concluded that, under Bosch, the state court litigation had established the
validity of the agreement and it could not be questioned by the Service.'" In a
short per curiam opinion that did not cite Bosch, the Seventh Circuit affirmed and
adopted the Tax Court's "meticulous" and "well considered opinion" in which it
"fully concur[red]. ' 'a
In Greene v. United States," the tax issue was whether the estate's debts,
expenses, and taxes were to be paid out of the portion of the estate renounced by
the surviving spouse (as the estate contended, thereby not reducing the marital
deduction) or out cf the entire estate (as the Service contended, thereby reducing the
marital deduction). The probate court agreed with the estate's position that the debts,
expenses, and taxes were to be paid out of the renounced portion of the estate.a
The estate contended that the probate court's decision bound the district court,
relying on a pre-Bosch district court decision holding that a probate court decision
was binding on a federal court even if the probate court had misapplied state
law. °3 The district court noted that the case relied on by the estate had been
1
198. 457 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), affg 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194 (1969).
199. Hatt v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194, 1199-1200 (1969).
200. Hatt, 457 F.2d at 499.
201. 476 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1973), affg 336 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
202. Greene v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 464, 466 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
203. Id. at 466-67 (citing Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Wis. 1955)).
"The decision of the County Probate Court has become final. We cannot now sit as an appellate court
to change the result of that decision.... What the County Court should have done in the light of [a
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"rather narrowly circumscribed" by Bosch. ' As a result, the district court stated
that it was "not bound" by the probate court decision, and that the Bosch "proper
regard" standard empowered the district court to 'reexamine the facts and state law
found in the ... state court proceeding ... [and to] ... decide the state law...
where the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and there is no
decision by the highest [state] court . . . as to such law."'" After a lengthy
examination of state law, the district court concluded that the probate court had
misapplied state law and that the debts, expenses, and taxes were payable out of the
entire estate.
On appeal, the estate argued that the district court had not given "proper regard"
to the probate court's decision as required by Bosch. The Seventh Circuit noted that
"the district court disagreed with the decision of [the probate] court, concluding that
the [state] Supreme Court would have decided the case differently if there had been
a party who had taken an appeal, and consequently decided not to follow it."'
After a de novo review of state law, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's conclusion that the probate court had misapplied state law. In addition,
the Seventh Circuit noted that "the record contains no indication of what reasoning
or case law the state court relied upon in reaching its decision, or what 'relevant
rulings' had been made by the 'other courts of the State."'" The Seventh Circuit
concluded that "[t]he district court may have also determined that the state court
decision was not tempered by a "'genuinely adversarial proceeding,' for appellant did
not contest the government's representation on this appeal that no appearance was
entered for the [other legatees under the will] in the state probate court proceed-
ing.
, 210
In Estate of Kraus v. Commissioner,2n husband in 1970 created a marital trust
that would have qualified for the marital deduction upon his death. Seven years
later, husband amended the trust in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
However, the amended trust failed to qualify for the marital deduction because it
did not give the surviving spouse a general power of appointment. Both the original
trust and amended trust were prepared by the decedent's cousin who was an attorney
specializing in estate planning.2 2 Husband died four years later, and the estate
claimed on the estate tax return that the trust qualified for the marital deduction.
After the Service disallowed the marital deduction and assessed a deficiency, the
contrary state supreme court decision] has become a moot issue."' Id. (quoting Weyenberg, 135 F. Supp.
at 302).
204. Id. at 467.
205. Id. (quoting JACOB MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL G1Ft AND ESTATE TAXATION § 10.23, at 343
(Supp. 1970)).
206. Greene, 366 F. Supp. at 468.
207. Greene, 476 F.2d at 119.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 119-20 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 481 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
211. 875 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1989), affg 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 600 (1988).
212. Estate of Kraus v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 600, 601 (1988).
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attorney, on behalf of the surviving spouse, petitioned the probate court to reform
the amended trust to qualify for the marital deduction. The petition asserted that the
decedent intended the trust to qualify for the marital deduction and that it failed to
do so because of a scrivener's error. After hearing the petition at a motion call with
only the attorney present, the probate court granted the requested reformation.21
The estate argued, based on Bosch, that the Tax Court was required to respect the
probate court's reformation of the trust to satisfy the requirements for the marital
deduction. The Tax Court engaged in a lengthy de novo review of state law and
concluded that the probate court misapplied state law in reforming the trust."'
The Seventh Circuit explained its standard of review on appeal as follows: "Our
job is to determine de novo whether the Tax Court applied the governing [state] law
and then to determine whether the Tax Court's application of [state] law to these
facts was clearly erroneous."25 The Seventh Circuit cited Bosch and Greene for
the proposition that a lower state court's reformation was not binding on the Tax
Court "because only the state's highest court can make a ruling on state law that
binds the federal courts."2 ' The Seventh Circuit noted that under Bosch, "[t]he
Tax Court was only required to give 'proper regard' to the [probate] court's
ruling."27 After reviewing the record and engaging in a de novo review of state
law, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "the Tax Court gave 'proper regard' to the
state court's ruling, despite the fact that the Tax Court reached a result different
from that of the state court."26
Although the Seventh Circuit cited Greene, it did not mention the fate of the
probate court's decree had there been an appeal in the state court system or the
special factors supporting de novo review in that case. However, the Tax Court's
recitation of the facts in Kraus demonstrates that no reasoning or support for the
probate court's decision (it was issued at a motion session) was given and that the
probate court decision was not the product of a genuine adversary proceeding (the
decedent's children and surviving spouse consented to the relief requested in the
petition, and only the estate's attorney appeared at the motion session).
L Eighth Circuit
Of the six Eighth Circuit cases that cite Bosch, four are tax cases. However, two
of the four tax cases did not specifically address the issue of the degree of deference
that federal courts must give to a state court's interpretation of state law in federal
213. Id. at 601-02.
214. Id. at 603-04.
215. Estate of Kraus, 875 F.2d at 600.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 600-01 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 601. Although the Seventh Circuit stated that it might "quibble" with one of the Tax
Court's findings, it was not "'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
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tax cases.2t9 In the remaining two cases, the Eighth Circuit engaged in de novo
review and concluded that the probate court had correctly applied state law.
In Keinath v. Commissioner,' son disclaimed his remainder interest in a trust
established upon the death of father in 1944. The trust provided a life estate for
mother, with vested remainders of one-half of the trust to each of son and brother.
If the remaindermen did not outlive their mother, the trust provided that their one-
half share would be distributed to their children. In 1963, two months after the
death of mother, son signed a document purporting to disclaim his interest in the
trust. The disclaimer was filed three-and-one-half months later in state probate court
at a hearing held to determine the effect of the disclaimer. The probate court ruled
that the disclaimer was valid and timely under state law and thus the trust proceeds
passed to son's children."'
The Service asserted that the disclaimer was not timely because it occurred
nineteen years after the appellant knew that he would inherit the trust proceeds if
he survived mother. At the time, a disclaimer was effective for federal tax purposes
if it was "effective under local law" and "made within a reasonable time after
knowledge of the existence of the transfer."' The Service argued that the
disclaimer failed both requirements and, as a result, son had made a taxable gift to
his children.
The Tax Court noted that, under Bosch, it was not bound by the determination
of the state probate court.' However, the Tax Court avoided the issue of the
validity of the disclaimer under state law and decided the case on the ground that
the disclaimer was not made within a "reasonable time" as a matter of federal tax
lawm
The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the federal tax law looked to state
law to determine whether the disclaimer was made within a "reasonable time."'
The Eighth Circuit stated that, under Bosch, "federal courts are not bound by a
particular decision of a state court regardless of whether the adjudication was
219. Elmore v. United States, 843 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1988); Estate of Brandon v. Commissioner,
828 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'g 86 T.C. 327 (1986).
220. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
221. Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352, 356 (1972).
222. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (as amended in 1986). Today, I.R.C. § 2518 provides detailed rules
governing the validity of disclaimers for federal tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2518 (1988). Section 2518(b)(2)
replaced the "reasonable time after knowledge of existence of the transfer" standard of the regulations
with a requirement that the disclaimer be made within nine months of the earlier of (1) the date on which
the transfer creating the interest in such person was made, or (2) the day on which such person attained
the age of 21. Id. § 2518(b)(2). The legislative history of § 2518 criticized Keinath, H.R. REP. No. 1380,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 66, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 735, 800, and the Supreme Court rejected the
Keinath approach, Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). See also Paul L. Caron, The Lurking
Retroactivity Issues in Irvine, 61 TAX NoTEs 1109, 1109-10 (1993).
223. Keinath, 58 T.C. at 356.
224. Id. at 357-58 ("We probably could wade through the morass of case law from other
jurisdictions and discover the Minnesota rule; however, we believe that we can decide this case on a less
precarious ground.").
225. Keinath, 480 F.2d at 62.
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nonadversary, consensual, or collusive[,] but instead must apply what they find the
state law to be, giving proper consideration to the lower state court's interpreta-
tion." After a lengthy de novo review of state law, the Eighth Circuit agreed
with the probate court's view of state law that the period for disclaiming a
remainder interest commenced with the death of the life tenant and that six months
from that date was a "reasonable time."'
In Folkerds v, United States,' husband left the residue of his estate outright to
wife. The estate claimed a marital deduction for the amount of the residue
remaining after application of the state's general abatement statute pursuant to the
probate court's decision. The Service disallowed the marital deduction on the
ground that there was no residue remaining after application of the state's special
abatement statute.
In the district court, the estate contended that the Service "failed to give the
decision of the State [probate] court 'proper regard' under Bosch.' However, the
district court believed that a "fair reading of the Bosch decision indicates that the
weight to be given state [lower] court opinions depends upon the extent to which
the action in the state court was contested or, in other words, whether the action
was 'a bona fide adversary proceeding.""'in Because the probate court decision was
the result of a ncnadversary proceeding, the district court gave it "very little
weight."'" After a lengthy examination of state law, the district court concluded
that the probate court had wrongly applied the general abatement statute. 2 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit, without citing Bosch, took a contrary view of state law
and reversed. 3
J. Ninth Circuit
Seven of the thhty Ninth Circuit cases that cite Bosch are tax cases.' 4 Howev-
226. Id. at 62 n.7.
227. Id. at 62-65.
228. 494 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'g 369 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
229. Folkerds v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1179-82.
233. Folkerds, 494 F.2d at 751-53. In its only mention of the probate court decision, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the abatement issue was "not a matter of controversy" in that proceeding. Id. at 751
n.4.
234. In two of the nontax cases, the parties had participated in prior state court litigation. In De
Jong Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061
(1980), a state court ruled that because the company purchased cattle under "subject" sale terms, it was
not required to pay for condemned cattle under state contract law. Id. at 1333. In a subsequent Packers
and Stockyards Act proceeding, the Ninth Circuit held, under Bosch, that the state court adjudication did
not result in claim preclusion or issue preclusion because the state's decision "was based on the state's
regulatory program rather than the federal program and the federal government was not party to the state
court proceedings." Id. at 1337. As a result, the administrative law judge was free to conclude that the
sale proceedings were conducted under "as is" rather than "subject" terms. Id.
In Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. Co., 591 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1979), a state court denied an insurance
company's summary judgment motion in an action to compel payment under a personal accident policy.
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er, six of the tax cases did not involve a prior state proceeding raising a state law
question at issue in the subsequent federal tax litigationY5 In the remaining tax
Two years later, the insurance company removed the case to federal district court. Id. at 75. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the insurance company timely filed its petition for removal
and refused the plaintiffs motion for remand to the state court. Id. at 78-79. The Ninth Circuit also
upheld the district court's ruling of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, noting that
under Bosch "this court has an independent duty to interpret and apply state law in accordance with
applicable state precedent." Id. at 83 n.9. The court did not accept plaintiffs argument that "because the
issue here is one of interpreting state law, we should defer to the state court's 'decision.'" Id.
235. Estate of Heim v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1990), affg 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 146
(1988); Elder v. Commissioner, 727 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1984), afflg 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1982);
Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981); Manalis Fin. Co. v. United States, 611
F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1980), affg 442 F. Supp. 579 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581
F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. United States, 518 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'g 369 F. Supp.
925 (D. Mont. 1973).
In Elder, the state court entered a divorce decree awarding wife a promissory note. Husband's appeal
to the state appellate court was unsuccessful, and he failed to make payments on the note. Husband and
wife then entered into a settlement agreement to amend the divorce decree by giving wife a minority
stock position in the family business and canceling the promissory note. Pursuant to this agreement, the
state court modified the divorce decree, nunc pro tunc, as of the date of the first judgment, giving wife
38% of the stock and husband 62% of the stock. The company then redeemed wife's shares for cash
pursuant to an agreement entered into the day before the settlement and court order. Elder v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 508, 509 (1982).
The Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that the stock redemption constituted a constructive
dividend to husband as payment in satisfaction of husband's liability on the note. The Tax Court
emphasized that the Service had not challenged the state court's power to modify its own order and
cancel husband's liability on the note. Id. at 510. On appeal, the Service argued that the state court had
exceeded its authority in modifying the divorce decree and that, under Bosch, the Tax Court should not
have given effect to the nunc pro tunc order. The Ninth Circuit refused to address this argument because
it was not made below. Elder, 727 F.2d at 859.
In Ahmanson Found., estate and wife reached a settlement agreement in compromise of wife's
community property claims. The estate argued that the amount wife received pursuant to the settlement
agreement qualified for the marital deduction. The Service contended that, under Bosch, "if a state court
adjudication as a result of a good faith adversary proceeding is not binding for estate tax purposes, then
a fortiori a private good faith settlement cannot be either." Ahmanson Found., 674 F.2d at 774. The
Ninth Circuit agreed and held that, under Bosch, the court had to reexamine the question of whether wife
had an enforceable right under state law to community property passing outside the will. Id. at 774-75.
In Manalis Fin. Co., the district court held that Lender's perfected security interest in Hospital's
account receivables had priority over a federal tax lien. Manalis Fin. Co. v. United States, 442 F. Supp.
579, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The district court stated that, under Bosch, it was not bound by dictum in
an intermediate state court decision giving priority to a state tax lien. The district court refused to follow
this decision because it departed from the language of the state statute. Id. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the Bosch "proper regard" standard and noted that the state court's dictum was not "considered
dictum." Manalis Fin. Co., 611 F.2d at 1272-73.
In Hibernia Bank, the executor borrowed funds to maintain decedent's mansion and deducted the
interest as administration expenses. The executor argued that the probate court's approval of payment
of the interest as administration expenses made them deductible for federal estate tax purposes. Affirming
the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that state law was not the exclusive test for deductibility and that
the expense here was not a valid "administration expense" for federal tax purposes. Hibernia Bank, 581
F.2d at 744.
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case, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed a Tax Court decision holding that a
lower state court had correctly applied state law.
In Smith v. Commissioner,0 taxpayer agreed to sell certain assets to buyer
pursuant to a sales contract containing a liquidated damages clause. Upon buyer's
default, taxpayer claimed the amount provided for in the contract as liquidated
damages. Buyer ccntested the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause in
state court on the ground that taxpayer's actual damages were less than 10% of the
amount claimed as liquidated damages. Taxpayer argued that the liquidated damages
clause was enforceable because the potential damages from a breach of contract
were uncertain and incapable of reasonable ascertainment. The state trial court
agreed and enforced the liquidated damages clause. While buyer's appeal was
pending in the state supreme court, the parties reached a settlement whereby
taxpayer retained 60% of the amount claimed as liquidated damages. The settlement
agreement recited the "conflict in judicial determination of the issues on appeal" and
characterized the 60% payment as the amount of actual damages suffered by
taxpayer from buyer's breach of contract. 7
The Service claimed that the amount received by taxpayer pursuant to the
settlement agreement was in the nature of liquidated damages and thus taxed as
ordinary income. Taxpayer contended that the payments should be taxed as capital
gain because they were received as actual damages to the capital asset property
subject to the sales agreement. The Tax Court noted that taxpayer's argument was
inconsistent with its position taken in (and sustained by) the state trial court that the
payments were for liquidated damages because actual damages were uncertain and
incapable of reasonable ascertainment." Although the Tax Court was "not bound
by the [s]tate court's decision" under Bosch, it concluded that the state court's
decision was "clearly correct.""9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a two paragraph
per curiam opinion that did not cite Bosch or refer to the state court's decision.'
K. Tenth Circuit
Of the fifteen Tenth Circuit cases that cite Bosch, eight are tax cases. However,
three of the eight tax cases did not directly consider the amount of deference that
federal courts must give to a state court's interpretation of state law in subsequent
federal tax cases." In the remaining five tax cases, the Tenth Circuit interpreted
236. 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), affg 50 T.C. 273 (1968).
237. Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 273, 278 (1968).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 282.
240. Smith, 418 F.2I at 574. In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit indicated that, under
Bosch, a probate court's decision in a case involving other parties could not be disregarded absent
"persuasive data" that the highest court of the state would rule otherwise. United States v. Pirrie, No. 71-
1146, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1973). In its Action on Decision, the Service contended that the
Ninth Circuit misconstrued Bosch in treating "an unrelated probate court decree as if it were an
intermediate appellate court pronouncement." Action on Decision (Nov. 16, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, AOD File, at *2).
241. Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980);
Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Estate of Wycoff v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 1144
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the "proper regard" standard as requiring independent review of the probate court's
application of state law. After such de novo review, the Tenth Circuit held that the
probate court had misapplied state law in three of these cases, and had correctly
applied state law in the other two cases.
In First National Bank v. United States, 2 the probate court approved payment
of a claim against the estate. The Service asserted that the claim was not deductible
by the estate because it was not allowable by state law under section 2053(a)(3),
despite the probate court holding to the contrary. The district court noted that, prior
to Bosch, the traditional rule in such a case was that "federal authorities would
accept a determination of property interests made at the state trial court level if the
determination was made in an adversary proceeding absent any collusion of the
parties." '43 The district court characterized Bosch as holding that "if the district
court is not satisfied with the state determination, then it is not bound by such
determination and it may redetermine the property interests."' After reviewing
state law, the district court concluded that the probate court had correctly applied
state law and thus the claim was deductible under section 2053(a)(3).24 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed and, after a de novo review of state law, agreed that "proper
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
In Dolese, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a state trial court determination carries no weight in a
federal tax proceeding because the Service is not a party to the state proceeding. In that case, a state trial
court ordered three corporations and the sole beneficial owner to each pay one-fourth of the legal
expenses of the owner's divorce and related proceedings. The Service disallowed the corporations'
claimed deductions of the expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses and treated the payments
as constructive dividends to the owner. Dolese, 605 F.2d at 1149. In affirming the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the Service on this issue, the Tenth Circuit stated that, under Bosch, "[tihe state
trial court had power under state law to impose the payment obligations upon the corporation, but such
a court cannot determine the federal tax consequences in an action to which the United States was not
a party." Id. at 1152.
In Imel, the district court had certified to the state supreme court a state law question that controlled
the federal tax consequences of a transfer of appreciated property pursuant to a divorce decree. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion, based on the state supreme court's answer to the
certified question, that the transfer was not a taxable event under United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962). lme!, 523 F.2d at 854. The Tenth Circuit cited Bosch along with other cases for the proposition
that although state law creates legal interests and rights, federal law determines the federal tax treatment
of those interests or rights created by state law. I. at 855.
In Wycoff, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's judgment that the amount of the estate's claimed
marital deduction had to be reduced by the amount of death taxes paid by the estate even though the state
probate court had ruled that these taxes had to be paid from the nonmarital trust portion of the estate.
The Tenth Circuit held that although "the apportionment of payment of death taxes is governed by state
law," "[t]he value of the marital deduction and the effect of death taxes upon the extent of the marital
deduction are to be determined as a matter of federal law." Wycoff, 506 F.2d at 1149, 1149 n.4. The
Tenth Circuit cited Bosch for the "relevant rule of construction" that the marital deduction is to be strictly
construed. Id. at 1149.
242. 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1970), affg 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,589 (D.N.M. 1969).
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application of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch [did] not require a retrial of the
issue of [the] validity and enforceability [of the claim]."'
In Kasishke v. United States,'l the probate court, "as a matter of routine,""a
again approved payment of a claim against the estate. The district court stated that,
under Bosch, it was not bound by the probate court's decree. After an independent
review of state law, the district court concluded that the probate court had
misapplied state law. Instead, the district court held that the claim was not
allowable under state law and thus not deductible under section 2053(a)(3). 9
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that under Bosch, a "federal court is not
necessarily bound by the decree of the state probate court."'  The Tenth Circuit
noted that "[i]n the absence of a controlling decision by the state court, a federal
district court's interpretation of local state law will be disturbed on appeal only if
the appellate court is convinced that the interpretation is clearly erroneous."'" The
Tenth Circuit apparently believed that the state probate court decree was not a
"controlling decision" and affirmed because it was not convinced that the district
court's interpretation of state law was clearly erroneous.'
In Murrah v. Wiseman,'z decedent died owning 50% of the stock of a closely
held company which his executors included as part of his estate. Four months later,
the executors obtained a probate court ruling that decedent's wife had acquired a
portion of this stock as marital property during the four-year period that the
community property laws of the state were in effect. The district court held that the
probate court had misapplied state law and denied the executors' refund claim.'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding after a de novo examination of state law that
"this is an instance where [the federal district] court properly declined to be bound
by the order of the probate court.""5
In Estate of Goldstein v. Commissioner,2 a state probate court permitted an
incompetent widow to elect to take one-half of the decedent's estate even though the
election was untimely pursuant to state statute." The Tax Court denied the
estate's claimed marital deduction on the ground that the probate court improperly
allowed the election as a matter of state law.s The Tenth Circuit reversed after
a de novo review of state law, convinced that the probate court's action was
consistent with state lawY9
246. First Nat'l Bank, 422 F.2d at 1387.
247. 426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970), affg 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,597 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
248. Kasishke v. United States, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 12,597, at 84,922 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
249. Id. at 84,922-23.
250. Kasishke, 426 1:.2d at 435.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 435-36.
253. 449 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1971), affg 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 112,696 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
254. Murrah v. Wisorman, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,696, at 84,904-05 (W.D. Okla., 1970).
255. Murrah, 449 F,2d at 190.
256. 479 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1399 (1971).
257. Estate of Goldstein v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1399, 1400 (1971).
258. Id. at 1403-05.
259. Estate of Goldstein, 479 F.2d at 816-20.
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In Estate of Selby v. United States,' husband died five months after wife.
Wife's estate passed to husband, thus escaping any estate tax liability because of the
marital deduction. However, husband's estate (which included the assets received
from wife's estate) incurred estate tax. Two days after husband's death, husband's
executor petitioned the state probate court to approve a disclaimer renouncing all
of husband's. rights and inthrests in wife's estate. Although the disclaimer was
untimely because it was filed after the period prescribed by state statute, the probate
court approved the disclaimer, citing "extraordinary circumstances" and a desire "to
preserve the equitable treatment of all beneficiaries involved."2" The disclaimer
did not affect the ultimate disposition of the property and was made solely to reduce
the estate tax on the combined estates.'
The district court granted the estate's claim for a refund. The district court
deferred to the state court's interpretation of state law in the interest of "main-
tain[ing] proper federal-state comity[,] 'J " and assumed "that the [probate] judge
knew the [state] law."' In its Action on Decision,' " the Service argued that the
district court's blind acceptance of the probate court's decision "was clearly
erroneous as a matter of law and warrant[ed] appellate review."'
The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that although it "underst[ood] and appreci-
ate[d] the district court's concern," such concern did "not permit the federal courts
to defer entirely without review."'" The Tenth Circuit observed that "[t]he
problem of what effect must be given a state court decree where the matter decided
there is determinative of federal estate tax consequences has long burdened the Bar
and the courts."' Bosch was "directly relevant" because the probate proceeding
was ex parte, was invoked to effect federal estate tax liability, and was concerned
with the application of the marital deduction.' The Tenth Circuit stated that, "in
accordance with Bosch, we must review the district court's decision in order to
determine whether the regard it gave to the state proceeding was 'proper,' and
whether it applied the correct state law.""27
This sentence provided the framework for the court's analysis: First, did the
district court give "proper regard" to the probate court's decision? Second, did the
probate court27' correctly apply state law? Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not
260. 726 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1984).
261. Id. at 645.
262. Id. at 644-45.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Action on Decision, No. CC-1981-85 (Mar. 19, 1981) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, AOD File).
266. Id. at *2.
267. Selby, 726 F.2d at 645.
268. Id. The court made the curious comment that Bosch "recognized a federal power of review in
this realm that was broader than in areas not having federal tax consequences." Id. (citing Caron,
Reformulating Complementary Roles, supra note 44, at 985-88).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 646.
271. The Tenth Circuit awkwardly refers to "it," which technically refers to the district court.
However, this interpretation does not make sense because the district court here did not apply state law;
19931
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discuss the degree of deference that a federal court must give to a state court's
interpretation of state law in a federal tax case under the "proper regard" standard.
However, the Tenth Circuit embarked on a de novo examination of state law and
concluded that "there was no justification in [state] law for the probate court's grant
of the Order of Disclaimer and the reopening of [wife's] estate to receive the
previously distributed assets."'
L. Eleventh Circuit
The two Eleventh Circuit cases that cite Bosch are not tax cases. However, the
Eleventh Circuit ha; adopted as binding precedent all decisions by the Fifth Circuit
through September 30, 1981.' As a result, the Eleventh Circuit would treat the
"proper regard" standard as requiring plenary review of a probate court's application
of state law under the pre-1981 Fifth Circuit decisions discussed previously in this
article. 4 In addition, the uncertainty in the Fifth Circuit carries over to the
Eleventh Circuit. One of the two Fifth Circuit decisions relying on the adversary
proceedings test was a pre-1981 decision,'" and the sole Fifth Circuit decision
requiring the federa court to determine whether the state supreme court would have
affirmed the probate court's decree had there been an appeal also was a pre-1981
decision. 6
M. Federal Circuit
Of the twelve Federal Circuit' cases that cite Bosch, eight are tax cases.
However, only one of the tax cases involved a prior state court proceeding.7 ' In
that case, after de novo review, the Court of Claims held that the probate court had
properly applied state law.
In Sun First National Bank v. United States,' grantor established a trust in
1941 that named herself as life income beneficiary. The trust consisted primarily
of stock that five years earlier had been valued at $11,000. In 1965, the trust sold
the district court merely ,,ccepted the probate court's interpretation of state law. More fundamentally, the
inquiry under Bosch is whether the probate court correctly applied state law; the question of whether the
district court correctly applied state law would bear only on whether the federal appellate court must give
any deference to the district court's interpretation of state law.
272. Id at 648 (emphasis added).
273. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (1lth Cir. 1981) (en bane).
274. See supra note3 123-56 and accompanying text.
275. Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1989); Bath v. United States, 480 F.2d 289
(5th Cir. 1973).
276. Estate of Salter v. Commissioner, 545 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1977).
277. For purposes of this discussion, the decisions of the former court of claims are included
because they are treated as binding precedent in the federal circuit pursuant to South Corp. v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
278. The other seven tax cases are Farley v. United States, 581 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bautzer
v. United States, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9246 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (per curiam); Lewis v. United
States, 485 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam);
Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Henley v. United States, 396 F.2d 956 (Ct. Cl.
1968); Boyce v. United States, 405 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (Skelton, J., dissenting).
279. 607 F.2d 1347 (Ct. CI. 1979).
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the stock for $1.5 million in cash and $4.8 million in fifteen promissory notes
payable annually from 1966 through 1980. The trustee treated this gain as income
rather than as an addition to the corpus of the trust and distributed most of it to the
income beneficiary. In 1967, a probate court approved the treatment of the trust
gain as income in the course of reviewing an accounting upon the resignation of the
trustee. Consistent with this ruling, for federal income tax purposes the trust
reported the gain from the notes as income during 1966 through 1972, and the
grantor reported amounts received as income from the trust,
After grantor's death in 1968, the Tax Court held that the corpus of the trust was
includible in her estate because she had retained a life interest within the meaning
of section 2036."' The trust then filed a refund claim for 1969 through 1972 on
the ground that the post-death payments on the notes constituted income in respect
of a decedent (IRD) that gave rise to a deduction to the trust (as the recipient of the
income) for the estate tax paid on that income. The Service rejected the refund
claim because it did not treat the gain on the notes as IRD.'
The IRD determination turned in part on whether the trust properly treated the
entire gain on the sale of the stock as allocable to income rather than corpus. After
a de novo review of state law, the Court of Claims held that the government did not
prove that the probate court had misapplied state law.' However, the Court of
Claims also relied in part on the lack of any tax motivation on the part of the
trustee in pursuing the probate court action.
In dissent, Judge Skelton argued that the majority had misread the probate court's
decision. Instead, Judge Skelton interpreted the probate court's decision in a manner
that was consistent with his view of state law.' Moreover, Judge Skelton
contended that the probate court decision was not entitled to "any weight" in light
of the nonadversary nature of the proceedings.
N. Conclusion
The following chart provides a circuit-by-circuit summary of the federal courts
of appeals' application of the Bosch "proper regard" standard over the past twenty-
five years. In particular, the chart notes whether a particular circuit (1) has followed
the state court judge's interpretation of state law; and (2) has considered the
adversariness of the state court proceeding in applying the "proper regard" test.
280. Id. at 1348-49.
281. Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164 (1973).
282. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d at 1349. The parties' arguments reversed the typical IRD
contentions where the Service claims that items are IRD (and thus taxable to the recipients) and the
taxpayer denies that the items constitute IRD (and thus not taxable to the recipients).
283. Id. at 1354.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1364-65 (Skelton, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 1366.
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TABLE 2 - SUMMARY OF BOSCH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Follow State Rely
Court on on
Circuit Case State Law? Adversariness?
D.C.
Estate of Draper
First 536 F.2d 944 (1976) Yes
Estate of Abeley
489 F.2d 1327 (1974) No Yes
Estate of Foster
Second 725 F.2d 201 (1984) No
Lemle
579 F.2d 185 (1978) No Yes
Magavern
550 F.2d 797 (1977) No
Bosurgi
530 F.2d 1105 (1976) Yes
Estate (!f Bosch
382 F.2d 295 (1967) No
Estate tf Hamilton
Third 577 F.2d 726 (1978) No
Estate tf Leggett
418 F.2d 1257 (1969) Yes
Estate tfDancy
Fourth 872 F.2d 84 (1989)
Sappington
408 F.2d 817 (1969) No
Estate ef Chagra
Fifth 935 F.21 1291 (1991) No
Brown
890 F.21 1329 (1989) No Yes
Estate cf Newman
624 F.22 1096 (1980) No
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TABLE 2 - SUMMARY OF BOSCH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Follow State Rely
Court on on
Circuit Case State Law? Adversariness?
Estate of Salter
545 F.2d 494 (1977) Yes
Wiles
491 F.2d 1406 (1974) No
Bath
480 F.2d 289 (1973) Yes
Risher
465 F.2d 1 (1972) No -
Cox
421 F.2d 576 (1970) No -
Grifth
Sixth 749 F.2d 11 (1984) Yes -
Krakoff
439 F.2d 1023 (1971) No -
Underwood
407 F.2d 608 (1969) Yes -
Estate of Kraus
Seventh 875 F.2d 597 (1989) No -
Greene
476 F.2d 116 (1973) No Yes
Hatt
457 F.2d 499 (1972) Yes
Folkerds
Eighth 494 F.2d 749 (1974) Yes
Keinath
480 F.2d 57 (1973) Yes No
Smith
Ninth 418 F.2d 573 (1969) Yes
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TABLE 2 - SUMMARY OF BOSCH IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Follow State Rely
Court on on
Circuit Case State Law? Adversariness?
Estate of Selby
Tenth 726 F.2d 643 (1984) No -
Estate, of Goldstein
479 F.2d 813 (1973) Yes -
Murrah
449 F.2d 187 (1971) No -
Kasishke
426 F.2d 429 (1970) No -
First NatVl Bank
422 F.2d 1385 (1970) Yes -
Eleventh
Sun First Nat'l Bank
Federal 607 F.2d 1347 (1979) Yes
III. The Future: Incorporating Erie Principles in a Post-Bosch World
Over a seventy-five year period, the federal courts have come full circle on the
effect of state court decisions in subsequent federal tax litigation. The Court began
the journey in 1916 in Uterhart by focusing exclusively on the comity concern in
giving "total regard" to all state court decisions. Twenty years later, the Court in
Freuler-Blair tried to temper the comity policy by forcing a consideration of the
revenue interest through the "collusion" standard. After thirty years of disarray as
the federal courts struggled to define collusion through the varying "fraudulent" and
"nonadversary" formulations, the Court in Bosch tried to reinject a balance between
the competing revenue and comity policies through the "proper regard" test.
However, the courts of appeals merely have paid lip service to the "proper regard"
standard and instead have undertaken a reexamination of state law, thereby giving
"no regard" to lower state court decisions. Moreover, four circuits have returned to
a pre-Bosch (and pre-Erie) focus on the adversariness of the lower state court
proceeding.
After twenty-five years of subversion of the Bosch "proper regard" standard by
the courts of appeals, the Court needs to revisit this issue.'n When it does, the
287. The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in a case challenging both the
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Court should reject the advice of commentators that exalt either the revenue" or
the comity' concern at the expense of the other. Instead, the Court should affirm
the use of Erie principles in Bosch and make clear that the "proper regard" test must
accommodate both concerns. However, the Court should take the courts of appeals
to task for using a traditional "top-down" Erie analysis in trying to predict how the
highest court of the state, as an original matter, would decide the state law
question. This approach ignores the special concerns in a Bosch-type situation
where the lower state court decision was a product of litigation involving the
taxpayer as a party. As I have argued elsewhere, federal authorities in this
situation should heed the Bosch Court's direction to "sit as a state court" by using
a "bottom-up" Erie analysis by giving the same deference to the lower state court
decision as would be given to it on appeal in the state court system.29
The cases discussed in part II of this article generally raise questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law in which greater deference would be given by state
appellate courts through "clearly erroneous," "abuse of discretion," or similar
standards than the courts of appeals have given under the de novo standard.2 As
application and viability of the Bosch "proper regard" standard. However, after hearing oral argument,
the Court dismissed the writ on technical grounds. United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'g 650 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 5 (1989) (per curiam). For further
discussion of White, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Attorneys' Fees in Estate Administration, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Feb. 1991, at 24; Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 836-42; Caron, Administration Expense,
supra note 44, at 352; Ted D. Englebrecht & Gregory A. Carnes, Standards for Deducting Administrative
Fees from an Estate Vary in the Circuits, 18 TAx'N FOR LAW. 210 (1990); Jerold I. Horn, Setting and
Deducting Fees in an Estates Practice, 24 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 3-1 (1990); John B. Huffaker,
IRS Can't Second Guess Award to Estate's Attorney, 66 J. TAX'N 312 (1987); Marilyn E. Nelson,
Deductibility for Estate Tax Purposes of Legal Fees and Administration Expenses, 30 TAx MGMT. MEM.
287 (1989); Eugene E. Peckam, White v. U.S. Upholds Deductibility of Attorney's Fees on Estate Tax
Returns, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1987, at 55; Robert A. Traylor, The Fox is on the Town, 0!: White v.
United States, N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1990, at 42; Comment, United States v. White: The Second Circuit
Validates an IRS Role in Policing State Probate Practice, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 669 (1990).
288. See, e.g., Michael H. Cardozo, IV, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court
Decisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783, 797 (1942) ("Mhe federal judge should be as free as a state judge to
declare what the [state] law is.").
289. See, e.g., Verbit, supra note 15, at 457 ("[A]II final decisions of state courts should be accepted
as binding in federal tax cases, regardless of the level of state court or the character of the proceedings
in that court.").
290. Caron, State Court Decisions, supra note 2, at 842-53; Caron, Tax Myopia, supra note 2, at
589-90.
291. Although there is some support for this approach in the case law (Estate of Salter v.
Commissioner, 545 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1977); Greene v. United States, 476 F.2d 116, 119 (7th
Cir. 1973); Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1969); Harrah v. Commissioner,
70 T.C. 735, 754 (1978)), one commentator has observed that the "courts adopting this view do not seem
to have given much attention to the standard of review the relevant supreme court would have applied
in reviewing the lower court decision." Verbit, supra note 15, at 442 n.188.
292. For a discussion of these standards of review, see generally 1 STEVEN A. CnLDRESS &
MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REvIEw 25-152 (1986); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 13.4 (1985); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §
12.8 (1985); 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, fEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585
(1971) (questions of fact); id. § 2588 (questions of law); id. § 2589 (mixed questions of law and fact);
1993]
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a result, in most cases this "bottom-up" approach would require federal authorities
to give more defe'ence to the lower state court's application of state law than is
currently provided through de novo review. This approach furthers the Erie goal of
approximating the results that would have been obtained in state court and balances
the competing revenue and comity interests.
Ellen S. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1991).
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